Federated Groups in Open Cloud Mesh using Messaging Layer Security

Introduction Open Cloud Mesh [OCM] currently supports sharing resources with individual users across federated servers and with groups on a single server. This document defines a new shareType, "federation", and registers it in the "OCM Share Types" registry defined by [OCM]. A "federation" share is addressed to a federated group identified by an OCM Address such as research-group@receiver.example.org whose membership spans multiple OCM servers, with group state managed through the MLS [RFC9420] epoch mechanism. In many Enterprise File Sync and Share (EFSS) systems, which constitute the vast majority of all OCM Servers, there is a tight coupling between a client and a server, because the server offers a built-in web interface as its primary client. In addition to this, a sync client is often offered as a way of syncing files between the EFSS system and the user's devices. In MLS, a client is defined as an agent that establishes shared cryptographic state with other clients, defined by the cryptographic keys it holds. An EFSS server meets this definition directly. For deployments where the primary user interface is a web client, the OCM Server fulfils the MLS client role server-side, holding key material on behalf of its users, and the word "client" as used in this document should not necessarily be taken to mean the user's file sync client. Implementations that do provide a native client application SHOULD perform cryptographic operations in the native client on the user's devices, rather than on the server, because this provides stronger isolation of key material from the server. A user participating from multiple native devices MUST do so using an MLS Virtual Client as specified in [ietf-mls-virtual-clients], with the devices acting as Emulator Clients. In either case the same MLS client model applies. Each user who is a member of a federated group has exactly one MLS leaf node, enabling individual users to be added and removed independently. The OCM Server can act as the MLS client on behalf of its users. For implementations where the primary interface is a web client, the OCM Server holds and uses key material server-side. Implementations with a native client application SHOULD perform cryptographic operations in the native client, with the server acting as a relay for MLS messages. Throughout this document, actions described as being performed by an OCM server are understood to be performed by that server in its capacity as an MLS client, on behalf of one of its users. The server holds no group membership or cryptographic state independent of its users. The group and its membership exist and evolve independently of any sharing activity. A user that wants to share a resource with a group can do so without the need to know the current membership details of that group. The MLS Delivery Service role is distributed: proposals are delivered to the home servers of all admins, the Group Owner Server arbitrates Commits, and File Key (FK) distribution messages are sent directly from sending servers to member servers, just like OCM share notifications. Group membership changes are managed entirely through MLS group lifecycle operations. Every group has one or more admins: users who administer the group. The user who creates a group is its first admin. Adding a member, or removing a member other than oneself, requires the approval of an admin, placing a human in the loop for changes that grant or revoke access. Any member can remove themselves from a group without admin approval, though the Commit is still performed by an admin client. All Commits that advance the MLS epoch are constructed by the MLS clients of admins and arbitrated by the Group Owner Server. The group's OCM Address is a stable label. It is minted under the domain of the server where the group was created, which guarantees its uniqueness, but it carries no routing semantics: all protocol messages are routed using the OCM Addresses of individual members and admins, never the group's. Files shared with a group can optionally be encrypted with a per-file key (FK), wrapped with the current group key. The group key is derived from the MLS epoch secret and rotates with every epoch transition. On every epoch transition the sending server re-wraps the FK under the new group key and redistributes it, so that the current group key is always sufficient to unwrap the current FK. When a member is added to a group, their MLS client receives the new group key and the re-wrapped FKs, and can immediately decrypt all resources shared with the group. When a member is removed from the group, sending servers MAY additionally generate a new FK and re-encrypt affected resources, depending on their policy and the nature of the shared data.

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Unless stated otherwise, every base64 encoded value this document, including MLS wire-format messages, KeyPackages, group_id values, and wrapped keys, is encoded using base64url (the URL- and filename-safe alphabet defined in [RFC4648], Section 5) with padding omitted. A decoder MUST accept such a value whether or not padding is present. This document uses terminology from [OCM], [RFC9420] and [ietf-mls-virtual-clients]. Additional definitions: Group - A Receiving Party identified by an OCM Address whose identifier resolves to a set of members spanning multiple OCM servers, with group state managed through MLS. The Group's OCM Address is a stable label assigned at creation and MUST NOT change for the lifetime of the Group; it carries no routing semantics. In [RFC9420] a group is defined as: "a logical collection of clients that share a common secret value at any given time. Its state is represented as a linear sequence of epochs in which each epoch depends on its predecessor." MLS Client - As defined in [RFC9420]: an agent that establishes shared cryptographic state with other clients, defined by the cryptographic keys it holds. In this protocol an OCM Server can fulfill this role. Virtual Client and Emulator Client - As defined in [ietf-mls-virtual-clients]. When a user participates from multiple devices, the user's single leaf in the federated group represents a Virtual Client and the devices are its Emulator Clients. The federated group is the Higher-level Group in that document. Member Server - An OCM server with one or more users who are members of a given Group, acting as MLS client on their behalf. Group Owner Server - The server currently arbitrating Commits for the Group: the home server of the first Admin in the admin set. Initially this is the server at which the Group was created. Admin - A user who administers the Group membership. The user who creates a Group is its first Admin. Only the MLS clients of Admins (admin clients) construct Commits. The admin set is part of the group state (). Admin Server - The home server of an Admin. Admin Servers collectively queue proposals for the Group. Group Key - A symmetric key derived from the current MLS epoch secret via the MLS Exporter, with the key length of the AEAD algorithm of the group's cipher suite. Rotates with every epoch transition. File Key (FK) - A random symmetric key used to encrypt a single shared resource. Wrapped with the current Group Key and distributed to Member Servers via MLS Application Messages. Re-wrapped under the new Group Key on every epoch transition (). Member Servers always store the most current wrapped FK for each resource. Re-encryption mode - On member removal, the sending server generates a new FK, re-encrypts the resource, and distributes the new wrapped key. Provides strong cryptographic guarantees independent of trust assumptions. Key-reuse mode - On member removal, the existing FK is kept and only the standard re-wrap on epoch change () is performed, without re-encrypting the resource. Appropriate only within formally trusted federations and where re-encryption is impractical. Mode is not a binary choice; sending servers can choose one mode for one epoch and another mode for another epoch, depending on policy and other circumstances. KeyPackage - As defined in [RFC9420]. A signed object that enables adding an MLS client to a group asynchronously. KeyPackages MUST be used only once, except for a designated last resort KeyPackage ([RFC9420] Section 16.8).

MLS Roles in OCM MLS is designed to operate with two supporting services: an Authentication Service (AS) and a Delivery Service (DS) ([RFC9420] Section 3; see also the MLS architecture [RFC9750]). This section describes how those roles are fulfilled by OCM.

Authentication Service The AS role is fulfilled by each user's home OCM server. Credentials in this protocol are MLS basic credentials ([RFC9420] Section 5.3) whose identity field is the UTF-8 encoded OCM Address of the user. Each user has their own distinct signing key material so that individual users can be identified and addressed independently within the MLS group, for example to add or remove a specific user. In web-client deployments the signing key material is generated and held by the OCM Server on the user's behalf. In native client deployments with one device it is held on that device. With multiple devices, signing key material is managed as specified for the Virtual Client in [ietf-mls-virtual-clients], and the server's role is limited to publishing the user's KeyPackages. A basic credential carries no verifiable binding of its own; the binding between a user's OCM Address and their signature key is attested by authenticated delivery from the user's home server. A KeyPackage fetched over TLS from the <endPoint>/mls-key-packages endpoint of the server named in the credential's OCM Address, with the response signed using HTTP Signatures [RFC9421] verifying against that server's JWKS endpoint at /.well-known/jwks.json [RFC7517], is considered validated with the AS. The full validation procedure, including how credentials introduced later in the life of a group are validated, is specified in .

Delivery Service The DS role is distributed across the servers of the group rather than centralised on a single server. MLS places no constraints on how the DS is arranged, as long as messages are delivered ([RFC9420] Section 3). Proposal delivery: MLS_PROPOSAL notifications are sent to the home server of every admin (), derived from the admin set and the OCM Addresses in the ratchet tree's leaf credentials. Admin Servers queue proposals, deduplicated by ProposalRef ([RFC9420] Section 5.2), and make them available to their admin clients. Commit arbitration: the Group Owner Server, the home server of the first admin in the admin set, accepts exactly one Commit per epoch from an admin client and broadcasts it to all Member Servers. FK distribution: MLS_APPLICATION messages carrying wrapped file keys are sent directly from the sending server to all current Member Servers, exactly like OCM share notifications; credential updates are sent to a single Member Server (). All MLS messages are delivered to the <endPoint>/notifications endpoint of each recipient server, authenticated with HTTP Signatures [RFC9421]. For a Virtual Client, the user's home server MUST deliver messages sent to or by the Virtual Client to all of its Emulator Clients, as required by [ietf-mls-virtual-clients] Section 5.1. Commits are constructed and signed by admin clients, but only the Commit accepted by the Group Owner Server takes effect; competing Commits for the same epoch are discarded by their senders. Designating a single arbiter of Commits eliminates conflicting Commits for the same epoch during normal operation, satisfying the sequencing requirement of [RFC9420] Section 14; conflicting Commits can arise only during failover and are then resolved deterministically (). Per [RFC9420] Section 14, generating a Commit does not modify the sender's state, so an admin client whose Commit is rejected simply discards it and constructs a new Commit on the new epoch. OCM share notifications are sent directly from the sending server to each Member Server. Since sending servers must be group members, they hold the current MLS ratchet tree after processing each MLS_COMMIT, and can derive the current membership - specifically the OCM Address in each leaf node's credential - to determine which Member Servers to contact. No proxying through the Group Owner Server is required for OCM-level communication. MLS is designed to protect confidentiality and integrity even against a misbehaving DS. No single server in this design carries the full DS role, and no server holds key material by virtue of its DS duties; the MLS security properties with respect to message confidentiality hold regardless.

How MLS is implemented over OCM MLS for group key management only. MLS establishes and rotates a shared group key. The only MLS application messages used in this protocol carry wrapped file keys () and per-server transport credential updates (). Exactly one MLS leaf per user. Each user who is a member of a federated group has exactly one MLS leaf node, enabling individual users to be added and removed independently. In web-client deployments the OCM Server manages that leaf on the user's behalf. A user participating from multiple native devices MUST represent those devices by a single Virtual Client leaf, with the devices acting as Emulator Clients in accordance with [ietf-mls-virtual-clients]. A leaf per device, the Simple Multi-client model defined by that document, MUST NOT be used. Adding or removing a device MUST use the emulation-group management procedures in [ietf-mls-virtual-clients] Section 6, not an Add or Remove in the federated group. Transitioning from a single device to multiple devices is an implementation detail that does not affect the protocol. A native client implementation is however RECOMMENDED to establish an emulation group when enrolling the user's first device and represent the user as a Virtual Client, even while that device is the only Emulator Client. The OCM Server is a MLS client. An OCM Server meets the MLS definition of a client. For web-client deployments this means key material is held server-side. For native client deployments cryptographic operations SHOULD be performed in the native client. Admins approve membership changes. Every group has one or more admins (). Commits are constructed by admin clients and arbitrated by the Group Owner Server. Add proposals and Remove proposals targeting another user require admin approval; any member may remove themselves, and Update proposals are committed automatically. Encryption is optional. MLS group management is useful independently of whether encryption is used. A federation share MAY be unencrypted, in which case the encryption field is omitted from the Share Creation Notification and the MLS layer provides only group membership management. FK re-wrap on every epoch change. After processing an MLS_COMMIT for a group, a sending server MUST re-wrap the current FK of every resource it shares with that group under the new Group Key and distribute it via MLS_APPLICATION (). This maintains the invariant that the current Group Key is always sufficient to unwrap the current wrapped FK. FK rotation on member removal. On member removal, a sending server SHOULD additionally rotate the FK for affected resources: generate a new FK, re-encrypt the resource, and distribute the new wrapped FK to all groups that share those resources. FK rotation may also be triggered by other factors such as periodic key rotation policy or suspected key compromise. Member addition does not require FK rotation; the standard re-wrap is sufficient. Key-reuse mode as an alternative. Where re-encryption on removal is impractical and where participating servers are mutually trusted within a formal federation, a sending server MAY instead keep the existing FK, relying on the standard per-epoch re-wrap alone. Sending servers must have group members. To share a resource with a group, the sending server must have at least one user who is a member of that group, allowing it to work out the members to share with, and to be able to wrap the FK for encrypted shares. This is by design, to mitigate spam shares and other abusive behaviour. OCM messages are still just OCM messages. Proposals flow to the servers of all admins, Commits are arbitrated by the Group Owner Server, and FK distribution and OCM share notifications flow directly from the sending server to each Member Server, derived from the sending server's local view of group membership from the MLS ratchet tree. No message is proxied through a single central server. Sending servers derive membership from the ratchet tree. Since sending servers must have group members, they process all MLS_COMMIT messages and hold the current ratchet tree. The OCM Address in each leaf node's credential identifies the corresponding Member Server. The sending server uses this to determine which Member Servers to contact directly for share notifications and FK distribution. Push-based FK distribution. Wrapped file keys are distributed via MLS_APPLICATION directly from the sending server to all current Member Servers, at share creation and after every epoch transition (). Member Servers always hold the current wrapped FK for each resource and use their current Group Key to unwrap it at access time. Minimal protocol surface. The shareType: "federation" value already defined in the OCM specification is used without modification, with shareWith carrying the group's OCM Address. A federation share is otherwise a standard OCM share, carrying every field REQUIRED by [OCM] including the protocol object. All new server-to-server messages use the existing /notifications endpoint with new notificationType values.

Discovery A server signals support for federation shares by including "federation" in the shareTypes array for a given resource type in its OCM discovery document at /.well-known/ocm:

No additional discovery fields are introduced. The notifications endpoint is derived as <endPoint>/notifications per the base OCM specification. The KeyPackage endpoint is derived as <endPoint>/mls-key-packages. A server that advertises "federation" MUST be able to receive OCM Notifications, since all MLS lifecycle messages are delivered as notifications, and SHOULD include "notifications" in its capabilities array.

KeyPackage Distribution Each OCM Server acting as an MLS client generates and maintains KeyPackages for its users and exposes them at:

/mls-key-packages?userId={userId} ]]> Response:

" } ] } ]]> Requests to this endpoint MUST be signed using HTTP Message Signatures [RFC9421] (). In native client deployments, the user's device generates KeyPackages and publishes them to the home server, which exposes them at the same endpoint without interpreting them. For a user with multiple devices, the Emulator Clients MUST create and coordinate the Virtual Client's KeyPackages as specified in [ietf-mls-virtual-clients] Section 5.5.1 before publishing them to the home server. Each KeyPackage contains an MLS Credential identifying the user by their OCM Address, signed by the user's own signing key pair. Users who require stronger isolation of key material from their server should use a native client implementation. KeyPackages MUST be one-time use, with the exception of a designated "last resort" KeyPackage ([RFC9420] Section 16.8). The server MUST remove a KeyPackage after it has been delivered. Servers SHOULD pre-generate multiple KeyPackages per user to support concurrent group additions, MAY designate a last resort KeyPackage per user to be returned when all single-use KeyPackages are exhausted, and SHOULD rate-limit KeyPackage requests, so that an attacker cannot block a user's addition to groups by exhausting their KeyPackages. KeyPackages carry a leaf node lifetime, and applications MUST define a maximum total lifetime they accept ([RFC9420] Section 7.2). The userId fields defined in this document carry the user's full OCM Address, not the bare identifier that [OCM] calls userID; the full address is required because these messages routinely cross server boundaries.

Group Lifecycle The group lifecycle is entirely independent of other OCM lifecycles (token-exchange, shares, invitations etc.). Members are added and removed through MLS group operations conveyed via the /notifications endpoint.

Group Creation The creating server creates an MLS group on behalf of one of its users and initialises leaf nodes for each of its users who are initial members. The creating user becomes the group's first admin (), making the creating server the initial Group Owner Server. No notifications are required for this step. The group becomes addressable at its OCM Address immediately upon creation. The group's OCM Address is minted under the creating server's domain, which guarantees its uniqueness, and MUST NOT change for the lifetime of the group. It is a label only: no protocol message is routed based on it, and it remains valid even after the Group Owner Server role has moved to another server. The MLS group_id SHOULD be a fresh random value, as recommended by [RFC9420] Section 11. The creator selects the group's MLS cipher suite based on the capabilities advertised in the prospective members' KeyPackages ([RFC9420] Section 11). Implementations of this document MUST support the mandatory-to-implement MLS cipher suite MLS_128_DHKEMX25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519 ([RFC9420] Section 17.1).

Group Admins Every group has a set of admins: users who administer the group membership. The user who creates the group is its first admin, and an admin MAY appoint further admins. Admins are ordinary group members and MAY be homed on any Member Server. An admin's MLS clients are referred to as admin clients. Commits MUST be constructed and signed by admin clients. This is an application-level policy on top of MLS, as anticipated by [RFC9420] Section 16.11, and it is enforced at two points. First, the Group Owner Server MUST reject Commits submitted by any other client. Second, every Member Server processing an MLS_COMMIT MUST verify that the Commit is signed by an admin client: a Commit is signed by the leaf indicated in its sender field ([RFC9420] Section 6.1), and the credential at that leaf, in the ratchet tree of the epoch in which the Commit was created, must identify a user listed in admins () as of that same epoch. A Commit that fails this check MUST be rejected, regardless of which server broadcast it. Because the admin set is part of the GroupContext, every member performs this check locally; acceptance of a Commit does not rely on trusting the Group Owner Server. Proposals are handled according to the following policy: An Add proposal, or a Remove proposal targeting a leaf that does not belong to the proposing user, MUST be explicitly approved by an admin before an admin client commits it, unless both are part of a rejoin pair as described below. This places a human in the loop for changes that grant or revoke another party's access. A Remove proposal targeting a leaf that belongs to the proposing user (self-removal) does not require admin approval. Any member MAY leave a group at any time, and admin clients SHOULD commit self-removal proposals automatically. A rejoin pair - a Remove of a leaf together with an Add of a fresh KeyPackage whose credential carries the same OCM Address as the removed leaf's credential () - is identity-preserving and grants no new party access. It does not require explicit admin approval, and admin clients SHOULD commit rejoin pairs automatically. Update proposals do not require admin approval, and admin clients SHOULD commit pending Update proposals automatically whenever they are online. The group MUST have at least one admin at all times. A proposal that would remove the last admin, including a self-removal, MUST be rejected by the Group Owner Server until another admin has been appointed. Removing an admin from the group and removing an admin from the admin set are distinct operations; when an admin's membership ends, a single Commit combines them (). An admin MAY instead resign from the admin set while remaining a member: this is a GroupContextExtensions proposal only, and the resigning admin's own client MAY commit it. Removing an admin's membership is constrained by MLS: a Commit that removes its own committer is invalid ([RFC9420] Section 12.2). A Commit that removes an admin's single leaf is therefore necessarily committed by an admin client of a different admin.

Group OCM Address and Admin Set The group's OCM Address and the admin set are part of the group state, carried in a GroupContext extension ocm_federated_group ([RFC9420] Section 13.4):

; } Admin; struct { opaque group_ocm_address; Admin admins; } OCMFederatedGroup; ]]> All addresses are UTF-8 encoded OCM Addresses. The group_ocm_address field carries the group's OCM Address and MUST NOT change for the lifetime of the group. The admins list is ordered by appointment: a newly appointed admin is appended at the end, a departing admin is deleted by the same Commit that ends their membership or admin role (see below), and the list MUST NOT otherwise be reordered. The home server of the first admin in the list is the current Group Owner Server. Succession is therefore automatic: when the first admin leaves the group or resigns as admin, the home server of the next admin in the list becomes the Group Owner Server. For example, if alice on server1 creates the group and appoints bob on server2 and then charlie on server3, the list is (alice, bob, charlie) and server1 is the Group Owner Server; after bob leaves it is (alice, charlie); after alice then leaves it is (charlie,) and server3 is the Group Owner Server. An admin client is any MLS client whose leaf credential identifies a user listed in admins. Because this extension is part of the GroupContext, it is agreed upon by all members through the MLS key schedule, every member can verify which clients are entitled to construct Commits and which server arbitrates them, and new members learn the group's OCM Address and admin set from the GroupInfo in their Welcome. Changes to the admin set are made with a GroupContextExtensions proposal ([RFC9420] Section 12.1.7); such proposals MUST be explicitly approved by an admin, MUST be committed by an admin client, and MUST NOT change group_ocm_address. The admin set and the group membership are coupled: an entry in admins is only meaningful while that admin's leaf is in the ratchet tree. A Commit that removes an admin's leaf MUST therefore also include a GroupContextExtensions proposal deleting that admin from admins, and the Group Owner Server and all Member Servers MUST reject a Commit that would leave an entry in admins with no corresponding leaf in the tree. (A rejoin pair () that replaces an admin's leaf does not trigger this rule, since the admin retains a leaf after the Commit.) Because a GroupContextExtensions proposal replaces the extension list wholesale ([RFC9420] Section 12.1.7), the proposal carries the complete new OCMFederatedGroup value, with the departing admin deleted and group_ocm_address unchanged. A GroupContextExtensions proposal whose only change to the admin set is deleting admins whose leaves are removed in the same Commit requires no separate admin approval; it follows the approval status of the Remove proposals it accompanies, so that the self-removal of an admin can still be committed automatically. Clients implementing this document MUST list the ocm_federated_group extension type in the capabilities.extensions field of their KeyPackages, since GroupContext extensions must be supported by every member of the group ([RFC9420] Section 13.4).

Group Owner Server Failover The Group Owner Server can become unavailable, leaving the group without an arbiter and therefore unable to advance its epoch. Leaf staleness () anchors the failover trigger: the absence of committed Updates from a leaf is part of the group state that all members observe identically. The other trigger condition, the absence of broadcast Commits, is necessarily observer-dependent - a server that missed a broadcast cannot distinguish silence from loss - which is why divergent failover decisions are tolerated and resolved deterministically in step 3 below. In addition to the update deadline, groups MUST define a takeover time T. T MUST be longer than the update deadline, so that the staleness of the first admin's leaf is observable before takeover is permitted. Failover proceeds as follows: Trigger: no MLS_COMMIT has been broadcast for time T, and the first admin's leaf is stale. Takeover: the home server of the next admin in the admin set MAY begin arbitrating Commits. The first Commit it arbitrates SHOULD cover a Remove proposal evicting the stale first admin's leaf, together with the GroupContextExtensions proposal deleting that admin from the admin set as required by , constructed by one of its own admin clients. This makes the takeover permanent through the normal succession rule. Conflict resolution: if a Member Server receives two different Commits for the same epoch from two arbiters, it MUST process the one arbitrated by the server of the admin listed earlier in the admin set and discard the other. Hold-back: a Member Server that has observed the trigger conditions of step 1 SHOULD retain the previous epoch's group state when processing a Commit, so that it can revert and reprocess the winning Commit if conflict resolution later discards the one it processed first. Retained state MUST be deleted after a bounded time, per [RFC9420] Section 14; the security trade-off is discussed in Security Considerations. Rejoin: a Member Server that processed a discarded Commit and no longer holds the state needed to reprocess the winning Commit has drifted from the group. It recovers through the rejoin procedure (). Wrapped FKs are re-wrapped and redistributed by their sending servers in the new epoch as usual (). Since an unavailable arbiter only pauses membership changes, while sharing, resource access, and FK distribution continue to operate, the takeover time T MAY be generous, for example several hours. Loose time synchronisation between servers is sufficient and is already assumed by MLS for leaf node lifetimes ([RFC9420] Section 7.2).

MLS Notification Types All MLS group lifecycle messages are sent as OCM Notifications to <endPoint>/notifications using HTTP POST with Content-Type: application/json and HTTP Signatures [RFC9421]. Proposals and Commits MUST be encoded as PublicMessage objects ([RFC9420] Section 6.2), and Application Messages as PrivateMessage objects ([RFC9420] Section 6.3). Handshake messages are sent in the clear at the MLS layer because the servers that route and arbitrate them are required to track the public group state, i.e the ratchet tree and GroupContext, in order to derive membership for share routing, resolve shares to local users, and verify that Commits are signed by admin clients; in native client deployments those servers do not hold the group's secrets. A recipient that holds the group's secrets MUST verify the membership_tag on a PublicMessage ([RFC9420] Section 6.2); a server relaying or arbitrating without group secrets verifies what it can, namely the signature against the sender's leaf in its copy of the ratchet tree and the policy checks of . The confidentiality trade-off relative to encrypted handshake messages is discussed in Security Considerations. The notification types defined in this document are group-scoped rather than share-scoped. [OCM] requires a providerId field in notifications because the notification types it defines all refer to a Share; the MLS notification types refer to a group instead, so this document updates that requirement: providerId is REQUIRED only for notification types that refer to a Share, and the MLS notification types omit it. All MLS-specific parameters are carried inside the notification object that [OCM] provides for type-specific parameters. The mlsGroupId field carries the base64url-encoded MLS group_id as advisory routing information, used to dispatch the message to the right group state without parsing the MLS message; the authoritative group_id is the one inside the MLS message itself, and a mismatch between the two MUST be treated as an error. At the OCM layer, groups are otherwise identified by their OCM Address: in particular, the groupId field of the application data carried inside MLS_APPLICATION messages (, ) is the group's OCM Address, never the MLS group_id. Since MLS_PROPOSAL is delivered only to Admin Servers and never broadcast to other Member Servers, Member Servers never observe pending proposals. Proposals covered by a Commit are instead redistributed together with that Commit, as described under MLS_COMMIT below. Admin clients, as the only committers (), MUST satisfy all considerations of [RFC9420] Section 12.4.

MLS_WELCOME Sent to a Member Server when one of its users is added to the group. The Welcome is constructed by the admin client that created the corresponding Commit ([RFC9420] Section 12.4.3.1) and delivered by that admin's home server directly to the added user's server, after the Group Owner Server has accepted the Commit. Delivers the MLS Welcome message for the added user, enabling the receiving MLS client to initialise its state and derive the current Group Key. A single MLS_COMMIT covering multiple Add proposals will result in one MLS_WELCOME notification per added user.

", "userId": "bob@othercloud.example.org", "content": "" } } } ]]> The Welcome message MUST include the group's ratchet tree in a ratchet_tree extension ([RFC9420] Section 12.4.3.3). By default a Welcome carries only a hash of the tree, and this document defines no other channel through which a newly added Member Server could obtain it. Member Servers depend on holding the current ratchet tree, both to derive the group membership and to process subsequent Commits. Carrying the tree inside the Welcome also gives it the same confidentiality protection as the rest of the group state, as recommended by [RFC9420] Section 12.4.3.3. A Member Server processing a Welcome learns the group's OCM Address from the ocm_federated_group extension in the GroupContext (). It MUST reject a Welcome whose group_ocm_address is already bound to a different MLS group_id, unless the Welcome reinitialises the group as described in . This keeps the local wrapped FK store, keyed by (resourceId, groupId), unambiguous.

MLS_PROPOSAL Sent by a Member Server to the home server of every admin to propose a group change (for example Add, Remove, Update, GroupContextExtensions, or ReInit) on behalf of one of its users. This notification is NOT broadcast to other Member Servers. Each Admin Server queues received proposals, deduplicated by ProposalRef ([RFC9420] Section 5.2), for handling by its admin clients according to the policy in . Sending the proposal to all Admin Servers removes the dependency on any single server being available and lets whichever admin is online next act on it.

", "content": "" } } } ]]>

MLS_COMMIT Constructed and signed by an admin client () and submitted to the Group Owner Server, which accepts at most one Commit per epoch, MUST reject Commits submitted by non-admin clients, and broadcasts the accepted Commit to all Member Servers to advance the group epoch. An admin client whose Commit is rejected discards it and MAY construct a new Commit on the resulting epoch ([RFC9420] Section 14). A Member Server receiving a broadcast MLS_COMMIT MUST verify that the Commit is signed by an admin client before processing it, as specified in , and MUST reject it otherwise, regardless of which server broadcast it. Commits are ordered by the MLS epoch itself: each Commit advances the epoch by exactly one, so Member Servers MUST process Commits in epoch order, and a Commit arriving for an epoch later than the next expected one indicates one or more missed Commits. Member Servers MUST apply the new epoch secret before sending any application data, per [RFC9420] Section 15.2.

", "proposals": [ "" ], "content": "" } } } ]]> A Commit covers each proposal either by value or by reference ([RFC9420] Section 12.4). Proposals included by value are carried inside the Commit itself and are necessarily proposals originated by the committing admin client, since a by-value proposal carries no sender of its own. Proposals received from Member Servers via MLS_PROPOSAL - in particular Update proposals, which can only be applied relative to their original sender's leaf - are covered by reference, and receiving Member Servers need the original proposal messages in order to validate and apply the Commit ([RFC9420] Sections 12.1 and 12.4.2). The proposals array therefore carries every proposal covered by reference, verbatim as originally sent by their proposers, in the order in which the corresponding references appear in the Commit. It MUST be present whenever the Commit covers at least one proposal by reference and MAY be omitted otherwise. A Member Server processing an MLS_COMMIT MUST process the carried proposals before processing the Commit itself. The MLS_COMMIT serves as the signal to all sending servers that the epoch has advanced: each sending server then re-wraps and redistributes the FKs of the resources it shares with the group (), and on member removal MAY additionally rotate them according to its policy (). Any Commit covering a Remove, Update, or GroupContextExtensions proposal MUST include an UpdatePath ([RFC9420] Section 12.4).

MLS_APPLICATION Sent by a sending server directly to Member Servers, derived from the ratchet tree, to deliver updated wrapped file keys and, optionally, updated per-server transport credentials (). No central relay is involved. Messages carrying wrapped FKs are sent to all current Member Servers; messages carrying a transport credential are sent only to the affected Member Server. The content is a PrivateMessage carrying application data encrypted in the current epoch ([RFC9420] Section 15).

", "content": "" } } } ]]> Ordering is provided by authenticated MLS metadata rather than a transport counter: the PrivateMessage carries the epoch in the clear, and the sender's leaf and generation counter are learned upon decryption ([RFC9420] Section 6.3). Since all FK updates for a given (resourceId, groupId) originate from the resource's sending server, the (epoch, generation) pair totally orders them; see . A Member Server that receives an MLS_APPLICATION encrypted in an epoch it has not yet entered SHOULD queue it until the corresponding MLS_COMMIT has been processed. Because credential-bearing messages are delivered to a single Member Server, other Member Servers will observe a gap in the sending leaf's generation counter on the next message they do receive. Such gaps are expected and MUST NOT be treated as an error; receivers ratchet forward past skipped generations as described in [RFC9420] Section 15.3. Deployments MUST limit the number of generations a receiver will advance a sender ratchet in response to a single message and reject messages beyond that limit, bounding the key derivation work a malicious sender can trigger ([RFC9420] Section 15.3).

MLS_REJOIN Sent by a drifted Member Server to the home server of every admin to request re-admission of its users after local MLS state loss (). Unlike the other notification types, the content is not an MLS message: a drifted server holds no usable MLS state, so the request is authenticated only at the OCM layer, by the HTTP Signature of the sending server. Each entry in keyPackages carries a fresh MLS KeyPackage for one affected user, in the same format as entries served by the KeyPackage endpoint.

", "keyPackages": [ { "userId": "bob@othercloud.example.org", "mediaType": "message/mls", "encoding": "base64url", "content": "" } ] } } } ]]> Admin Servers queue rejoin requests alongside proposals and make them available to their admin clients, which handle them as described in . A later rejoin request for the same group and user supersedes an earlier one; admin clients act on the most recent request.

Leaf Key Updates To maintain post-compromise security ([RFC9420] Section 16.6), Member Servers SHOULD periodically send MLS_PROPOSAL (Update) to the Admin Servers to rotate their users' leaf keys. Admin clients SHOULD commit pending Update proposals automatically whenever they are online, without user interaction; an Update only achieves post-compromise security once it has been committed ([RFC9420] Section 16.6). Groups MUST define an update deadline: the maximum time allowed between committed Updates of a leaf. A leaf that has not been updated within the deadline is stale. Members with stale leaves SHOULD be removed from the group per [RFC9420] Section 3.2, and stale admins in particular SHOULD be removed promptly: an admin whose clients no longer update cannot commit, and a stale first admin additionally blocks Commit arbitration until failover ().

Rejoin After State Loss A Member Server can lose its MLS state for a group: it may have processed a Commit that was later discarded during failover conflict resolution () and already deleted the superseded epoch's secrets per the deletion schedule ([RFC9420] Section 9.2), or its stored state may be lost or corrupted for any other reason. Such a server has drifted from the group: it can no longer process Commits or decrypt Application Messages, and because MLS messages are bound to the current GroupContext, it cannot sign a valid Proposal with which to recover. A drifted server detects its condition when an MLS_COMMIT fails to process against its local state, for example through a confirmation tag mismatch, or arrives for an epoch it cannot reach after Commit retransmission has been exhausted. Recovery is mediated by an admin client through the normal Commit path: The drifted server discards its MLS state for the group and generates a fresh KeyPackage for each of its users who are members of the group. A KeyPackage for a Virtual Client MUST be generated and coordinated as specified in [ietf-mls-virtual-clients] Section 5.5.1. It sends an MLS_REJOIN notification carrying those KeyPackages to the home server of every admin. The notification is authenticated at the OCM layer with HTTP Signatures [RFC9421], the same trust anchor that authenticates KeyPackage distribution itself, so a rejoin request is exactly as trustworthy as a freshly fetched KeyPackage. An admin client verifies that each KeyPackage's credential carries the OCM Address of a leaf currently in the ratchet tree, and that the notification was signed by the server named in those OCM Addresses. A rejoin MUST NOT admit a user without a leaf in the tree; it can only replace existing members. The admin client constructs a single Commit containing, by value, a Remove proposal for each stale leaf and an Add proposal for the corresponding fresh KeyPackage. This rejoin pair preserves the OCM Address of every affected leaf and grants no new party access, so admin clients SHOULD commit it automatically, per the policy in . The Commit is arbitrated and broadcast as usual, and the drifted server receives one MLS_WELCOME per re-added user, restoring clean state from the Welcome's ratchet_tree extension. A single Commit recovers all of the drifted server's users at once. Until the rejoin completes, the drifted server can continue to serve resources whose wrapped FKs it received before the fork, using the Group Key of the last epoch it processed; wrapped FKs distributed after the fork become accessible when the re-wrap following the rejoin Commit () arrives.

Group Reinitialisation Reinitialisation ([RFC9420] Section 11.2) replaces a group with a new MLS group with the same membership and the same OCM Address but different parameters: a new MLS version, cipher suite, or extension set, and necessarily a fresh MLS group_id. It is the migration path for cryptographic agility, for example moving a long-lived group to a stronger cipher suite. A ReInit proposal is a group parameter change and is handled like other group-changing proposals: it MUST be explicitly approved by an admin and MUST be committed by an admin client. Per [RFC9420] Section 12.2, a ReInit proposal is committed alone. The extensions field of the ReInit proposal MUST include an ocm_federated_group extension with group_ocm_address unchanged; the admin set is normally carried over unchanged. After the ReInit Commit is processed, the old group MUST NOT be used to send messages ([RFC9420] Section 12.4.2). In particular, sending servers MUST NOT send MLS_APPLICATION messages in the old group; the per-epoch re-wrap obligation () arising from the ReInit Commit is deferred to the new group. The admin client that committed the ReInit SHOULD create the new group: it fetches fresh KeyPackages, valid for the new version and cipher suite, for every member of the old group, creates the new group with an initial Commit re-admitting them, and sends each member a Welcome carrying a PreSharedKeyID of type resumption with usage reinit, as specified by [RFC9420] Section 11.2. The Add proposals of this initial Commit re-admit the old group's members and require no separate admin approval. If the committing admin client fails to complete this step in reasonable time, any other admin client MAY do so instead. If a Member Server receives competing reinitialisation Welcomes for the same group_ocm_address, it MUST accept the one whose new group was created by the admin listed earliest in the old group's admin set and reject the others. A Member Server processing a reinitialisation Welcome MUST perform the verifications of [RFC9420] Section 12.4.3.1 for usage reinit: the last Commit of the old group contains the ReInit proposal, the new group's parameters match it, and every member of the old group is a member of the new group, where members are equivalent if their leaf credentials carry the same OCM Address. It MUST additionally verify that the group_ocm_address of the new group equals that of the old group. On success it rebinds the OCM Address from the old group_id to the new one; this is the only case in which that binding may change. Because the local wrapped FK store is keyed by the group's OCM Address, stored entries carry over unchanged. After joining the new group, a sending server MUST re-wrap the FK of every resource it shares with the group under the new group's Group Key and redistribute the wrapped FKs to all Member Servers, exactly as for an epoch change (). The new group's Group Key differs from any key of the old group both through the fresh epoch secret and through the new group_id in the Exporter context, so no wrapped FK from the old group can be unwrapped in the new one. Until the re-wrapped FKs arrive, Member Servers retain the old group's last Group Key under the same retention rule as for an epoch change. Members SHOULD retain the resumption PSK of the old group's final epoch until the reinitialisation has completed ([RFC9420] Section 8.6).

Encryption Model

Group Key Derivation After processing any MLS Welcome or Commit, the MLS client MUST apply the new epoch secret before encrypting any application data, then derives the current Group Key:

AEAD.Nk is the length in bytes of a key for the AEAD algorithm of the group's negotiated MLS cipher suite ([RFC9420] Section 9.1). Deriving the Group Key at exactly this length makes it a valid key for the wrap AEAD (), which is the AEAD algorithm of the group's cipher suite, for every cipher suite, including those whose AEAD takes a 16-byte key such as AES-128-GCM. The MLS Exporter ([RFC9420] Section 8.5) produces application-specific key material from the epoch secret without exposing the epoch secret itself. The label "ocm-group-key" scopes the output to this application. The group_id_bytes context, the raw MLS group_id of the group, further binds the output to this specific group. The Group Key therefore changes with every epoch transition and cannot be derived by any party that did not participate in that epoch. Per [RFC9420] Section 8.5, the Group Key SHOULD be refreshed after each processed Commit. Security-sensitive values derived from the epoch secret MUST be deleted as soon as they are consumed, per [RFC9420] Section 9.2. All MLS clients in the group independently derive the same Group Key for a given epoch.

Resource Id The resourceId used in the AEAD associated data MUST be a stable identifier for the underlying file, consistent across all groups it is shared with. It identifies the resource, not a particular version of it or a specific share. This ensures that the FK unwrapped by members of any group correctly decrypts the same ciphertext. The providerId values in separate share notifications, for the same resource, MUST differ, per the providerId definition in [OCM], but the resourceId in the AEAD associated data MUST be the same. This means that the providerId MUST NOT be reused as resourceId. The sending server is responsible for maintaining this stable resourceId and MUST send it in the encryption object of the share payload ().

File Key Wrapping Two AEAD algorithms are involved in protecting a resource, and they are deliberately decoupled. The content AEAD encrypts the resource itself: it is chosen by the sending server from the AEAD algorithms defined for HPKE ([RFC9180] Section 7.3), it is fixed for the lifetime of a ciphertext and identical across all groups the resource is shared with, and it is identified explicitly by the cipher field of the encryption object (). The wrap AEAD protects the FK in transit: it is always the AEAD algorithm of the respective group's MLS cipher suite, keyed with that group's Group Key, and may therefore differ between groups that share the same resource. When sharing an encrypted resource with a group, the sending MLS client acts on behalf of a user who is a member of that group: Chooses the content AEAD and generates a random per-file key (FK) whose length is the key length of that algorithm. Encrypts the resource with FK using the content AEAD. Implementations supporting native client decryption of large files SHOULD use a chunked AEAD construction to enable streaming decryption. Derives the current Group Key from the user's local MLS state. Wraps FK using the wrap AEAD:

where the associated data is the serialisation of the following structure, in the presentation language of [RFC9420]:

; opaque resource_id; } FKWrapAAD; ]]> The group_ocm_address field is the UTF-8 encoding of the group's OCM Address (the same value carried in the shareWith field of the share notification) and resource_id is the UTF-8 encoding of the resourceId field of the encryption object. The length-prefixed encoding makes the pair unambiguous; raw concatenation of the two strings would allow distinct (address, identifier) pairs to produce identical associated data. The MLS group_id is NOT used in the associated data. Sends an MLS_APPLICATION notification directly to all current Member Servers, carrying the wrapped FK keyed by (resourceId, groupId).

FK Re-wrap on Epoch Change The Group Key changes with every epoch transition, whatever the reason for the transition: a Commit covering Add, Remove, Update, or GroupContextExtensions proposals, or an empty Commit, all advance the epoch. To maintain the invariant that the current Group Key is always sufficient to unwrap the current wrapped FK, a sending server MUST, after processing an MLS_COMMIT for a group, or after joining the successor group of a reinitialisation via its Welcome (), for every resource it shares with that group: Re-wrap the resource's current FK under the new Group Key, following the procedure in . Distribute the new wrapped FK to all current Member Servers, derived from the new ratchet tree, via MLS_APPLICATION. Note that the FK itself is unchanged by this procedure; only its wrapping is refreshed. Whether the FK is also rotated is a separate, removal-triggered policy decision (). If the Commit added one or more members, the set of Member Servers may have grown. The sending server MUST identify Member Servers that are new to the group and send them the Share Creation Notifications for its federation shares with the group, as described in , in addition to the wrapped FKs. A server that joins the group after a share was created thereby receives both the share itself and a wrapped FK it can decrypt, since the MLS_APPLICATION is encrypted in an epoch in which it is a member. Between processing a Commit and receiving the re-wrapped FK for a resource, a Member Server holds a wrapped FK produced under the previous epoch's Group Key. To remain able to serve access requests in this window, a Member Server SHOULD retain the previous epoch's Group Key until it has received a strictly newer wrapped FK () for every locally stored (resourceId, groupId) pair of that group, or until a bounded time has elapsed, whichever comes first, and MUST delete it at that point. The security trade-off of this retention window is discussed in Security Considerations. The volume of MLS_APPLICATION traffic produced by this rule grows with the number of shared resources and the frequency of epoch transitions; see the batching item in Open Issues.

Key Distribution via MLS Application Messages Wrapped file keys are distributed to Member Servers via MLS Application Messages, PrivateMessage objects carrying application data ([RFC9420] Section 15). Wrapped FKs are distributed at share creation and re-distributed after every epoch transition (). A sending server MUST process the MLS_COMMIT and derive the new Group Key before sending an MLS_APPLICATION with updated wrapped keys, per [RFC9420] Section 15.2. The PrivateMessage application data is a JSON object carrying the current wrapped FK for each (resourceId, groupId) pair in a keys array, and MAY also carry a credentials array ():

" } ] } ]]> The groupId field carries the group's OCM Address, matching the shareWith of the corresponding share notification, and the resourceId field matches the resourceId in the encryption object of that notification. The PrivateMessage is encrypted using the current epoch's keys, so only current group members can decrypt it. A just-removed member cannot decrypt the Application Message even if they receive the notification, as they do not hold the new epoch's key material. Member Servers store the received wrapped FKs locally, keyed by (resourceId, groupId), always replacing any previous wrapped FK for the same pair with the latest one. "Latest" is defined by the authenticated (epoch, generation) of the enclosing PrivateMessage, compared lexicographically, not by arrival order: a stored wrapped FK MUST only be replaced by one with a strictly higher (epoch, generation). A sending server MUST send all FK updates for a given group through a single MLS leaf within any given epoch, since generation counters are maintained per leaf; updates from a later epoch always supersede updates from an earlier epoch regardless of leaf. MLS Application Messages may be delayed or reordered in transit ([RFC9420] Section 15.3); a Member Server that receives an out-of-order MLS_APPLICATION simply ignores wrapped FKs that are not newer than those it already holds. At access time, the Member Server uses its current Group Key, derived from its current MLS state for the identified group, to unwrap the FK.

Transport Credential Updates The per-server transport credential of a share () may need to be rotated during the lifetime of the share. In particular, in native client deployments the user's device interacts directly with the sending server and therefore holds its server's credential, so when such a user is removed from the group, the credential of their server can no longer be considered private to that server's remaining users. On removal of a member whose clients may have held a server's transport credential, the sending server SHOULD rotate that server's credential for every share affected. Rotation MAY also be triggered by policy or suspected leakage. A rotated credential is delivered in an MLS_APPLICATION message sent only to the affected Member Server, carrying a credentials array in the application data:

" } ] } ]]> Each entry identifies the share by its providerId, the group by its OCM Address in groupId, and the intended Member Server by its FQDN in recipient. A Member Server MUST ignore entries whose recipient does not name itself. Upon accepting an entry, the Member Server replaces the stored transport credential for that share; replacement follows the same (epoch, generation) supersede rule as wrapped FKs (). The sending server invalidates the old credential once the rotation has been delivered. Encrypting the credential update in the current epoch guarantees that the removed member cannot read it, independent of transport protection: they do not hold the new epoch's key material. Confidentiality with respect to other Member Servers, by contrast, rests on targeted delivery: the PrivateMessage is decryptable by any group member that obtains it, so delivering it to the affected server only is a routing measure, not a cryptographic one (see Security Considerations). A keys array and a credentials array MAY appear in the same application data object when both are destined for the same single Member Server.

Resource Access To access a resource: The resource is fetched from the sending server using the standard OCM resource access procedure ([OCM]), with the protocol details and per-server credential from the protocol object of the share notification. For an encrypted resource, what is fetched is ciphertext. The MLS client identifies the relevant group from the shareWith field of the share notification and looks up the locally stored wrapped_file_key for the (resourceId, groupId) pair. The MLS client derives the current Group Key from its local MLS state for that group and unwraps FK using the wrap AEAD of the group's cipher suite. The MLS client decrypts the resource using FK and the content AEAD named in the cipher field of the encryption object. In web-client deployments, decryption happens server-side and the plaintext is served to the user through whatever access protocol is in use (WebDAV [RFC4918], SFTP, webapp, etc.). In native client deployments, decryption happens on the user's device and the client interacts directly with the sending server, which serves only ciphertext.

Resource Modification by Member Servers A common operation is for a user on a Member Server to open a shared encrypted resource, modify it, and save it back. The cryptographic flow is as follows: The Member Server fetches the encrypted resource from the sending server using the standard OCM resource access procedure, with the credential from the share's protocol object. The Member Server identifies the relevant group from the shareWith field of the share notification, looks up the locally stored wrapped_file_key for the (resourceId, groupId) pair, derives the current Group Key from its local MLS state for that group, and unwraps FK. The Member Server decrypts the resource using FK and presents the plaintext to the user. The user modifies the resource. The Member Server re-encrypts the modified resource using the same FK and the same content AEAD, but a fresh random nonce. The nonce MUST NOT be reused with the same key, as required by AEAD security. The Member Server uploads the re-encrypted resource to the sending server. This requires the share to grant write permission in its protocol object. The FK is reused across modifications of the same resource because it is bound to the group's OCM Address and resourceId in the AEAD associated data, making it specific to that resource. No new MLS_APPLICATION message is needed, as the wrapped FK in all Member Servers' local stores remains valid for the updated ciphertext. FK rotation for a resource is only necessary on member removal in re-encryption mode ().

Sharing a Resource with Multiple Groups A sending server MAY share the same encrypted resource with more than one group. The file is encrypted once, with a single FK and a single content AEAD; the cipher field in every group's share notification names that same algorithm. Each group receives its own wrapped FK, produced with that group's wrap AEAD, Group Key, and OCM Address:

A separate Share Creation Notification is sent to each Member Server of each group. A separate MLS_APPLICATION carrying the respective wrapped FK is broadcast to each group's Member Servers. Members of each group can only unwrap the FK using their own group's Group Key and cannot access the other group's wrapped FK or Group Key. The sending server MUST maintain a mapping from each resource to all groups it has been shared with. This mapping is required to correctly handle member removal in re-encryption mode, as described in the following section.

FK Rotation (RECOMMENDED) FK rotation is distinct from the re-wrap performed on every epoch change (): rotation generates a new FK and re-encrypts the resource, whereas a re-wrap only refreshes the wrapping of the existing FK. A sending server SHOULD rotate the FK for a resource when a member is removed from any group that has access to it. FK rotation may also be triggered by other factors, such as periodic key rotation policy, regulatory requirements, or a suspected compromise of key material. Applications SHOULD define a policy for the frequency of FK rotation independent of membership changes. When rotating the FK for a resource, the sending server: Generates a new FK for the resource. Re-encrypts the resource with the new FK. For every group that has access to the resource, wraps the new FK using that group's current Group Key:

Broadcasts an MLS_APPLICATION notification carrying the respective new wrapped FK directly to each group's Member Servers. Distributing the new wrapped FK to all groups that share the resource is necessary because all groups share the same ciphertext. If only one group received the new wrapped FK, members of other groups would hold a wrapped FK that no longer decrypts the current ciphertext. A member removed from one group but still a member of another group that shares the same resource retains the ability to decrypt that resource through the second group. This is correct and intended behaviour: access is determined by current group membership, and the user remains a member of the second group. The default safe rule is to rotate the FK and redistribute to all groups on any removal event. A sending server MAY instead compare the unique set of users with access before and after an epoch change, and skip FK rotation if that set is unchanged, for example because the removed user remains a member of every other group that has access to the same resource. Whether this optimisation is worth the added complexity depends on the nature of the resource and the frequency of membership changes. Member addition does not require FK rotation. The new member receives the current Group Key via their Welcome, and the re-wrap triggered by the Add Commit () delivers a wrapped FK, encrypted in an epoch in which the new member is a member, that the new member can unwrap with that Group Key.

Member Removal: Key-reuse Mode (OPTIONAL) Where re-encryption is impractical, for example due to frequent changes of very large files, and where all participating servers belong to a formal federation with explicit governance and mutual trust, a sending server MAY instead keep the existing FK. In that case no action beyond the standard re-wrap on epoch change () is required: the Remove Commit advances the epoch, and the sending server re-wraps the existing FK under the new Group Key and distributes it to the remaining Member Servers of the affected group. When a resource is shared with multiple groups, only the epoch of the group from which the member was removed has advanced, so only that group's FK wrapping is refreshed. The wrapped FKs for other groups are unchanged and remain valid for their respective members. In this mode, access-follows-membership relies on trust rather than cryptography: the FK itself is unchanged, so a removed member's server and, in native client deployments, the removed user's devices, may still hold the superseded Group Key together with the old wrapped FK, or the unwrapped FK itself, any of which decrypts the unchanged ciphertext. Key-reuse mode therefore relies on trusting servers to discard key material they are no longer entitled to after a Remove Commit. A removed member who is also a member of another group that has access to the same resource will still be able to decrypt via that group's wrapped FK, which is the expected behaviour - they remain a member of that group. This assumption is appropriate within a formal federation but SHOULD NOT be made in open or ad-hoc sharing contexts. The sending server's choice of mode is its own policy decision and is not signalled in the protocol.

Member Removal: OCM Notifications Member removal requires no OCM-level notification by itself. Because federation shares are addressed to the group (), each Member Server observes the Remove Commit and re-evaluates which of its local users the share resolves to; a removed user loses access without any action by the sending server. If the removed member's clients may have held their server's transport credential, the sending server SHOULD additionally rotate that credential (). When the last member homed on a given server is removed from the group, that server no longer has any user with access. A well-behaved sending server SHOULD then reconcile the OCM state of the share, revoke that server's per-server transport credential (), and send a SHARE_UNSHARED notification to the /notifications endpoint of that server.

Share Creation The sending server sends one OCM Share Creation Notification directly to each current Member Server, identified through the OCM Addresses in the ratchet tree's leaf credentials. This is standard OCM server-to-server communication, with shareWith set to the group's OCM Address and shareType set to "federation". The share is addressed to the group as the Receiving Party; no per-user notifications are sent. A federation share is a standard OCM share: every field that is REQUIRED by [OCM], including the protocol object, is REQUIRED here too, and resource access follows the standard OCM resource access procedure driven by the protocol object. For encrypted resources the protocol endpoint serves ciphertext; the plaintext is obtained by unwrapping the FK as described in the Encryption Model. Each Member Server SHOULD be given its own sharedSecret (or equivalent protocol credential) in its copy of the notification. The credential is per server, not per user: all users on a Member Server share it, mirroring how the server holds MLS state on behalf of its users. Distinct per-server credentials allow the sending server to revoke a single server's transport access, for example when the last group member on that server is removed, without affecting other Member Servers. Share Creation Notifications sent to servers that join the group later () carry credentials minted at that time, and a server's credential can be rotated during the share's lifetime (). Share Permissions apply uniformly to the whole group: every member of the group receives the same permissions on the resource. A sending server that needs different permissions for different parties should use separate groups or individual shares. Receiving Server criteria that affect the share payload, such as must-exchange-token, are evaluated per Member Server against that server's discovery document, exactly as in base OCM. The receiving server resolves shareWith against its local MLS state: it identifies the group whose group_ocm_address () matches the shareWith value and delivers the share to every local user whose leaf credential appears in that group's ratchet tree. On every subsequent MLS_COMMIT the receiving server MUST re-evaluate this resolution, so that local users added to the group gain access to existing federation shares, and removed users lose it, without any further OCM notifications. Addressing the share to the group also allows the receiving server to distinguish between shares of the same resource arriving via different groups - a user may be a member of two groups that both have access to the same resource from the same sending server - and to correctly key its local wrapped FK store by (resourceId, groupId) rather than resourceId alone, where groupId is the group OCM Address carried in shareWith, ensuring that FK updates delivered via MLS_APPLICATION are applied to the correct entry. Because notifications can be delayed or reordered in transit, a federation share MAY arrive before the receiving server has processed the Welcome or Commit that made it a Member Server of the group. A receiving server that does not recognise the shareWith value as a known group SHOULD queue the share, or reject it in a way that causes the sender to retry, rather than fail it permanently. Since sending servers only contact servers present in the ratchet tree, this condition is transient. When an MLS_COMMIT adds one or more members to the group, the sending server MUST send each Member Server that is new to the group a Share Creation Notification for every federation share it has with that group, encrypted or not. For encrypted resources this accompanies the re-wrapped FK (). A server that joins the group after a share was created thereby learns of the shares its users now have access to without any further action by its users. Each notification MAY include the optional encryption field:

", "permissions": ["read", "write"] } }, "encryption": { "resourceId": "3a02538b-aa54-42f2-8853-a38996e211b1", "scheme": "ocm-mls", "ocm-mls": { "cipher": "AES-256-GCM" } } } ]]> The encryption field is OPTIONAL as per [OCM] Share Creation Notification specification. If absent, the resource is unencrypted. If present, and the symmetric encryption available via OCM-MLS is to be used, it MUST carry the encryption-related parameters according to the [OCM] specification, where: - resourceId is the stable resource identifier described in - scheme is to be set to "ocm-mls" - cipher names the content AEAD that the resource is encrypted with (), one of the AEAD algorithms defined for HPKE ([RFC9180] Section 7.3): "AES-128-GCM", "AES-256-GCM", or "CHACHA20-POLY1305". The field signals that the FK is distributed via the MLS_APPLICATION mechanism keyed by (resourceId, groupId). No epoch information is carried in the share notification. Member Servers always hold the current wrapped FK for each (resourceId, groupId) pair and use their current Group Key to unwrap it at access time. The Group Owner Server is not involved in the delivery of OCM Share notifications. All other OCM notifications relating to a share, such as share updates and share deletions, are likewise sent directly from the sending server to each Member Server, referencing the share by its providerId as in base OCM.

Trust and Authentication The Authentication Service role ([RFC9420] Section 3) is fulfilled by each user's home OCM server: the server that publishes a user's KeyPackages attests the binding between the user's OCM Address and their signature key. Because the basic credential itself carries no verifiable binding, the attestation lies in the delivery channel.

Validation procedure A KeyPackage is considered validated with the AS when all of the following hold: it was fetched from the <endPoint>/mls-key-packages endpoint of the server named in the credential's OCM Address, over TLS, with the response signed using HTTP Signatures [RFC9421] verifying against that server's JWKS [RFC7517]; the OCM Address in the credential is identical to the userId the KeyPackage was requested for, which is the OCM Address of the user the requester intends to add; in particular, its host part names the server the KeyPackage was fetched from; and the KeyPackage signature verifies with the signature_key of its LeafNode, proving possession of the private key ([RFC9420] Section 10.1). Requests to the KeyPackage endpoint are signed at the server level (), so in native client deployments the fetch is performed by the admin's home server on the admin client's behalf. The home server SHOULD relay the response with its HTTP Message Signature intact, allowing the native client to verify the channel binding end-to-end against the target server's published JWKS; a native client that cannot do so delegates the channel verification to its home server and verifies the KeyPackage signature itself. [RFC9420] Section 5.3.1 requires a credential to be validated whenever it is introduced into the group. This protocol distributes that duty to the party that introduces the credential: Add: the admin client committing an Add MUST have validated the KeyPackage as described above. Other members accept the new leaf on the strength of the admin-signed Commit; they do not contact the new member's home server. Update proposals, and Commits whose UpdatePath carries a new credential: the successor credential MUST present the same OCM Address as the credential it replaces, and members MUST reject the proposal or Commit otherwise. This is the successor-credential policy anticipated by [RFC9420] Section 5.3.1. Continuity of the signature key is anchored in MLS itself: the message introducing the new leaf is signed with the member's current key, so only the holder of the previous key can rotate to a new one. Joining via Welcome: the joiner MUST verify the GroupInfo signature and the integrity of the ratchet tree as required by [RFC9420] Section 12.4.3.1, and MUST verify that every leaf credential is a basic credential carrying a well-formed OCM Address. The joiner accepts the bindings of those credentials transitively, on the basis that each was validated by an admin client when it was introduced. It MAY additionally re-validate any leaf against the /mls-key-packages endpoint of its home server, but such re-validation can fail benignly, since published KeyPackages rotate independently of leaves already in groups. In this transitive model, each home server is trusted to attest only its own users, and each admin client is trusted to have performed the attestation check at introduction time. The protocol does not independently verify assertions made by a user's home server, because that server is the Authentication Service for its users. Compromise of that trusted server is outside the threat model. Users who require protection of their key material from their own server should choose a native client implementation where cryptographic operations occur on the user's device.

Security Considerations

Threat Model The threat model follows the Internet threat model described in [RFC3552] and inherits the trust assumptions of [OCM]. It assumes that the OCM Servers participating in a group, including Member Servers, Admin Servers, and the Group Owner Server, have not been compromised and correctly enforce the protocol and their local authorization policies. Their administrative interfaces, host operating systems, private keys, credentials, and underlying storage are part of the trusted endpoints. Compromise of an OCM Server or its trusted infrastructure is outside the scope of this specification. An attacker is assumed to have extensive control of the communication channel and may observe, block, replay, insert, modify, delay, or reorder traffic. TLS, HTTP Message Signatures, and MLS provide the protections described in this specification against such an attacker. An attacker may control a remote user, a current or former group member, or an OCM Server of its own. It may send malformed messages, retain key material it legitimately obtained while it was a member, disclose plaintext or keys available to it, and attempt to cause inconsistent group state or resource exhaustion. An attacker-controlled server can make assertions under its own identity, but must not thereby gain authority for users outside its administrative domain or admission to a group without the required authorization. The distributed Delivery Service is not trusted to provide availability or consistent delivery. It can delay, drop, reorder, selectively deliver, or partition messages and can observe metadata deliberately exposed by this protocol. It cannot derive group secrets or forge valid MLS messages. The Group Owner Server is trusted to arbitrate Commits, but its unavailability can stall epoch transitions until failover completes. In web-client deployments, the trusted OCM Server acts as the MLS client and holds MLS state, Group Keys, FKs, and plaintext on behalf of its users. Native-client deployments move that cryptographic endpoint to the user's device. Exposure of member key material and subsequent recovery are considered according to the forward-secrecy and post-compromise-security properties of [RFC9420]; full compromise of an OCM Server remains outside scope. Every current group member is an authorized recipient of the group's cryptographic material. MLS cannot prevent a member from retaining or disclosing plaintext, Group Keys, or FKs that it legitimately receives. A member with write access and the applicable FK can also create a cryptographically valid arbitrary payload for a shared Resource. MLS authenticates the member performing a protocol operation; it does not establish that the member or supplied content is benign. This protocol deliberately accepts several deployment-dependent trade-offs described below. Encryption is optional. Key-reuse mode trades cryptographic revocation for operational efficiency and trust in former Member Servers. Temporary retention of previous or forked epoch state weakens forward secrecy for a bounded period. Public handshake messages and distribution of the ratchet tree expose group membership and membership changes to participating servers. The protocol does not provide protection from complete or selective denial of service. Virtual Clients. All Emulator Clients of a Virtual Client hold the secret state needed to act as that Virtual Client. Compromise of one device therefore compromises the Virtual Client, and the devices must fully trust one another. Implementations MUST follow the onboarding, removal, state-transfer, key-deletion, nonce-protection, and ratchet coordination requirements and security considerations of [ietf-mls-virtual-clients]. FK rotation vs key-reuse. FK rotation provides cryptographic access revocation on member removal, independent of trust assumptions, and SHOULD also be performed periodically or when key compromise is suspected. In key-reuse mode the FK is unchanged and the ciphertext is not re-encrypted, so revocation is not cryptographic: it relies on trusting servers to discard all key material they are no longer entitled to after a Remove Commit. This includes superseded Group Keys, old wrapped FKs, and any cached unwrapped FKs. Key-reuse mode SHOULD only be used within formal federations with governance agreements that enforce this behaviour. Two access-control layers. For an encrypted federation share, access is controlled at two independent layers: the per-server transport credential in the protocol object gates who can fetch the ciphertext, and the Group Key gates who can unwrap the FK and decrypt it. Confidentiality rests on the cryptographic layer alone; the transport credential provides defence in depth and is shared by all users on a Member Server. The two layers can diverge: a server whose last group member was just removed may still hold a valid transport credential until the sending server revokes it, which is why revocation SHOULD accompany the SHARE_UNSHARED notification. For unencrypted federation shares the transport credential is the only access control, exactly as in base OCM, and access-follows-membership then depends on the receiving server re-evaluating share resolution on every Commit () and on the sending server revoking the credentials of departed servers promptly. Credential rotation. Rotated transport credentials are delivered in group-encrypted MLS_APPLICATION messages sent only to the affected server (). A removed member is excluded cryptographically: it does not hold the new epoch's key material. Other Member Servers are excluded only by targeted delivery; a credential message that leaks to another member server is readable by it. Since every Member Server already holds transport access to the same ciphertext under its own credential, the impact of such a leak is limited to transport-layer attribution. Key distribution via Application Messages. Wrapped FKs are distributed in MLS PrivateMessage objects encrypted in the current epoch. A removed member cannot decrypt these messages as they do not hold the new epoch's key material. Because sending servers re-wrap and redistribute FKs after every epoch transition (), and Member Servers always replace their locally stored wrapped FK with the latest received, the current Group Key is always sufficient for unwrapping once the re-wrapped FKs have arrived. Group Key retention window. Between processing a Commit and receiving the re-wrapped FKs for the new epoch (), a Member Server may retain the previous epoch's Group Key in order to keep serving access requests. This retention extends the lifetime of the previous epoch's Group Key and therefore weakens forward secrecy for the duration of the window. The window is bounded by the arrival of the re-wrapped FKs, and Member Servers MUST delete the previous Group Key as soon as it is no longer needed, or after a bounded time, whichever comes first. Commit ordering. The Group Owner Server is the sole arbiter of Commits, eliminating conflicting Commits for the same epoch during normal operation. An unavailable Group Owner Server can stall epoch transitions, but the Delivery Service and network attackers cannot cause the group to accept a Commit constructed by a non-admin client, because every Member Server independently verifies the committer against the admin set before processing a Commit (). The role passes automatically to the next admin's server when the first admin leaves the group (), and an unavailable arbiter is eventually replaced through failover (), during which conflicting Commits can briefly exist and are resolved deterministically. Forked-state retention. During a detected failover window, Member Servers retain the previous epoch's group state so that they can revert to the winning Commit (). Retaining forked state weakens forward secrecy for its duration; [RFC9420] Section 14 requires such state to be deleted promptly, so the retention is bounded in time and limited to servers that have observed the failover trigger. Rejoin. The rejoin procedure () lets a home server replace its own users' leaves with fresh KeyPackages on the strength of its HTTP Signature alone, without per-request admin approval. The procedure relies on the home server's existing role as the Authentication Service for its own users and therefore introduces no additional trust assumption. Because admin clients verify that a rejoin only replaces leaves whose OCM Addresses name the requesting server and that are already present in the ratchet tree, a rejoin cannot admit a new party. Admin liveness and removal latency. A Remove proposal takes cryptographic effect only when an admin client commits it. Removing another member additionally requires explicit admin approval, so the revocation latency for a membership change is bounded by admin availability. Groups SHOULD appoint multiple admins, on multiple Member Servers, to keep this window small and to avoid stalling group operations when a single admin is offline. The same bound applies to the post-compromise security provided by Update proposals, which only take effect once committed. Application message ordering. Per [RFC9420] Section 15.2, sending servers MUST apply a new epoch secret before encrypting any application data. MLS_APPLICATION messages carrying re-wrapped keys MUST be sent only after the sending server has processed the corresponding MLS_COMMIT. Ordering and the DS. All ordering in this protocol derives from MLS-authenticated metadata: Commits are ordered by the epoch they advance, and FK updates by the (epoch, generation) of the enclosing PrivateMessage. No unauthenticated transport counter is relied upon. Servers in the DS role can still delay, drop, or selectively withhold messages, but cannot reorder them undetectably or forge them, consistent with the MLS threat model ([RFC9420] Section 16.9). Reinitialisation continuity. A reinitialisation Welcome is accepted only with a resumption PSK from the old group's final epoch and after verification of the old group's ReInit Commit and of membership preservation (). A party that was not a member of the old group's final epoch cannot produce that PSK, so the binding between a group's OCM Address and its MLS group state cannot be hijacked through a forged reinitialisation. Handshake message confidentiality. Proposals and Commits are sent as PublicMessage, so group operations are visible to the servers that handle them. The MLS architecture [RFC9750] recommends encrypting handshake messages to hide membership changes and signatures from the Delivery Service; this protocol deliberately departs from that recommendation because the servers performing the DS role must know the group's membership anyway: sending servers derive notification recipients from the ratchet tree, and receiving servers resolve federation shares to their local users. No information is exposed to those servers beyond what their OCM duties already require, and transport protection (TLS and HTTP Signatures [RFC9421]) prevents exposure to outside observers. Application Messages, which carry key material, are always encrypted as PrivateMessage. Group membership and admin enumeration. The ratchet tree contains the OCM Address of every group member, and the GroupContext contains the group's admin set. This information forms part of the MLS group state and its changes are conveyed in public handshake messages. Every group member and every Member Server can therefore enumerate all members and admins of the group and observe membership and admin-set changes over time. This is an accepted privacy trade-off inherent to this design: servers need the membership information to route shares and notifications, resolve federation shares to local users, and enforce admin policy. Federated groups do not provide anonymous membership or hidden administrator roles. The information is not exposed by the protocol to servers outside the group, although an authorized member or Member Server can disclose it, and transport protection prevents exposure to outside observers in transit. Admin set integrity. The admin set and the group's OCM Address are carried in the GroupContext (), so they are covered by the MLS confirmation tag and agreed upon by all members of every epoch. A malicious server cannot unilaterally appoint admins or seize the Group Owner Server role; changing the admin set requires a Commit constructed by an existing admin client. Post-compromise security. Member Servers SHOULD periodically rotate their users' leaf keys via Update proposals to maintain post-compromise security ([RFC9420] Section 16.6). Members that do not update SHOULD eventually be removed from the group. Key material deletion. Security-sensitive values MUST be deleted as soon as they are consumed, per [RFC9420] Section 9.2. In particular, the exporter_secret used to derive the Group Key must not be retained after the Group Key has been derived. KeyPackage reuse. KeyPackages MUST be one-time use, except for a designated last resort KeyPackage used when a user's single-use KeyPackages are exhausted ([RFC9420] Section 16.8). Servers MUST remove a KeyPackage that has been consumed, and SHOULD rate-limit KeyPackage requests to make exhaustion attacks impractical. User enumeration. A server MUST only reply to HTTPS GET requests signed using HTTP Message Signatures [RFC9421] and SHOULD implement rate limiting and other access control methods on the /mls-key-packages endpoint to avoid user enumeration.

Underlying Security Specifications This specification relies on the base Open Cloud Mesh protocol [OCM], the Messaging Layer Security protocol [RFC9420], HTTP Message Signatures [RFC9421], and JSON Web Keys and JWK Sets [RFC7517]. All security considerations in those specifications apply to implementations of this protocol. The security and privacy considerations of the MLS architecture [RFC9750] also apply. Implementations using Virtual Clients additionally need to follow all security considerations of [ietf-mls-virtual-clients], as required above. Where this specification uses AEAD algorithms defined for HPKE, the applicable algorithm and nonce-management considerations of [RFC9180] apply, although this specification does not otherwise use the HPKE construction.

IANA Considerations The MLS Exporter label "ocm-group-key" used in the Group Key Derivation section is to be registered in the "MLS Exporter Labels" registry defined in [RFC9420] Section 17.8, to avoid collisions with other applications using the MLS Exporter: Label: "ocm-group-key" Recommended: N Reference: This document The GroupContext extension ocm_federated_group defined in is to be registered in the "MLS Extension Types" registry defined in [RFC9420] Section 17.3: Value: TBD Name: ocm_federated_group Message(s): GC Recommended: N Reference: This document The following notification types are to be registered in the "OCM Notification Types" registry defined in [OCM], within the "Open Cloud Mesh (OCM) Parameters" group:

The following entry is to be registered in the "OCM Share Types" registry defined in [OCM], within the "Open Cloud Mesh (OCM) Parameters" group. This document is the registering specification for the "federation" share type:

The following entries are to be registered in the "OCM Share Payloads" registry defined in [OCM], within the "Open Cloud Mesh (OCM) Parameters" group. They extend the existing "webdav", "webapp", and "ssh" protocols to the "federation" share type; the wire format of the share payload for these combinations is completely specified by this document together with [OCM] (see ). These registrations do not modify the protocols' own registrations:

The following entries are to be registered in the "OCM Encryption Schemes" registry defined in [OCM], within the "Open Cloud Mesh (OCM) Parameters" group:

Open Issues This section collects open design issues and shall be removed before publication. Streaming decryption. A chunked AEAD construction enabling streaming decryption of large files should be specified for native client implementations. The specific construction and its interaction with the FK wrapping model needs to be defined. Application Message batching. The frequency and batching of MLS_APPLICATION messages carrying wrapped FKs needs to be defined. Since every epoch transition triggers a re-wrap of every shared resource's FK (), batching is load-bearing when many shares exist and epoch transitions are frequent. Commit retransmission. A missed Commit is detected directly from the MLS epoch: a Commit arriving for a later epoch than the next expected one indicates a gap. A mechanism for requesting retransmission of missed Commits, from the Group Owner Server or any Admin Server, needs to be specified. Retransmission is the first remedy for a gap; the rejoin procedure () is the fallback when retransmitted Commits can no longer be applied. The proposed OCM Journaling mechanism can be useful in this context.

Changes This section collects the changes with respect to the previous version in the IETF datatracker. It is meant to ease the review process and it shall be removed when going to RFC last call. The complete changelog is updated in the OCM-API GitHub repository.

Version 02 Following the introduction of an encryption object for Shares in Version 07 of [OCM] and a corresponding IANA Registry, this document has been adapted and corresponding registry entries have been added.

Version 01 Following the introduction of IANA Registries in Version 06 of [OCM], all registry entries related to the federation share type have been introduced in this document.

References

Normative References [OCM] Lo Presti, G., de Jong, M.B., Baghbani, M. and Nordin, M. "Open Cloud Mesh", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft. [ietf-mls-virtual-clients] Alwen, J., Kohbrok, K., McMillion, B., Mularczyk, M. and Robert, R. "MLS Virtual Clients", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-mls-virtual-clients-01. [RFC2119] Bradner, S. "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", March 1997. [RFC4648] Josefsson, S. "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", October 2006. [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", May 2015. [RFC8174] Leiba, B. "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", May 2017. [RFC9180] Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B. and Wood, C. A. "Hybrid Public Key Encryption", February 2022. [RFC9420] Barnes, R., Beurdouche, B., Robert, R., Millican, J., Omara, E. and Cohn-Gordon, K. "The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol", July 2023. [RFC9421] Backman, A., Richer, J. and Sporny, M. "HTTP Message Signatures", February 2024.

Informative References [RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and Korver, B. "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, July 2003. [RFC4918] Dusseault, L. M. "HTTP Extensions for Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning", June 2007. [RFC9750] Beurdouche, B., Rescorla, E., Omara, E., Inguva, S. and Duric, A. "The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture", April 2025.

Acknowledgements This work builds on the Open Cloud Mesh specification and the discussions in the OCM community. Work on this document has been funded by [Sovereign Tech Agency][sta] through the Tech Fund, with a specific project.