Web Authorization Protocol O. Terbu
Internet-Draft MATTR
Intended status: Standards Track D. Fett
Expires: 4 March 2027 Authlete Inc.
B. Campbell
Ping Identity
31 August 2026
SD-JWT-based Verifiable Digital Credentials (SD-JWT VC)
draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-19
Abstract
This specification describes data formats as well as validation and
processing rules to express Verifiable Digital Credentials with JSON
payloads with and without selective disclosure based on the SD-JWT
format.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization
Protocol Working Group mailing list (oauth@ietf.org), which is
archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-sd-jwt-vc.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 March 2027.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. SD-JWT as a Credential Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Verifiable Digital Credentials based on SD-JWT . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Media Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Data Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2. JWT Claims Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1. Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2. Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4. Verification and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5. Issuer Verification Key Discovery and Validation . . . . 20
3. Retrieving Documents and Resources via HTTP . . . . . . . . . 21
4. JWT VC Issuer Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5. SD-JWT VC Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1. Type Metadata Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2. Type Metadata Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.3. Retrieving Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.3.1. From a URL in the vct Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.3.2. From a Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.3.3. Using a Defined Retrieval Method . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.3.4. From a Local Cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.4. Extending Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.5. Display Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.5.1. Rendering Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.5.2. Extending Display Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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5.6. Claim Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.6.1. Claim Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.6.2. Claim Display Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.6.3. Claim Mandatory Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.6.4. Claim Selective Disclosure Metadata . . . . . . . . . 36
5.6.5. Extending Claim Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.7. Processing Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6. Integrity of Referenced Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.1. Server-Side Request Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.2. Serving Documents and Rendering Resources . . . . . . . . 41
7.3. Ecosystem-specific Public Key Verification Methods . . . 41
7.4. Circular "extends" Dependencies of Types . . . . . . . . 41
7.5. Robust Retrieval of Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.6. Risks Associated with Textual Information . . . . . . . . 42
7.7. Credential Type Extension and Issuer Authorization . . . 42
7.8. Trust in Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.9. Use of Data URIs for Claim Types . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.10. SVG Rendering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.1. Unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.2. Verifiable Digital Credential Type Identifier . . . . . . 44
8.3. Issuer Phone-Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.4. Privacy-Preserving Retrieval of Type Metadata . . . . . . 46
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9.2. Media Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9.2.1. application/dc+sd-jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9.3. Well-Known URI Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
9.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.1. Example Person Identification Data (PID) Credential . . . 50
A.2. Example Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Appendix C. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
1. Introduction
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1.1. Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model
In the so-called Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model, Issuers issue
Verifiable Digital Credentials to a Holder, who can then present the
credentials to Verifiers. Verifiable Digital Credentials are
cryptographically secured statements about a Subject, typically the
Holder.
Figure 1 depicts the Issuer-Holder-Verifier model.
+------------+
| |
| Issuer |
| |
+------------+
|
Issues SD-JWT VC
|
v
+------------+
| |
| Holder |
| |
+------------+
|
Presents SD-JWT VC
|
v
+-------------+
| |-+
| Verifiers | |-+
| | | |
+-------------+ | |
+-------------+ |
+-------------+
Figure 1: Abstract Depiction of the Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model
Verifiers can check the authenticity of the data in Verifiable
Digital Credentials. Verifiers can also optionally enforce Key
Binding, which requires the Holder to prove they are the intended
Holder of the Verifiable Digital Credential. This proof is typically
done by demonstrating possession of a cryptographic key referenced in
the credential. This process is further described in [RFC9901].
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1.2. SD-JWT as a Credential Format
JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [RFC7519] can in principle be used to express
Verifiable Digital Credentials in a way that is easy to understand
and process as it builds upon established web primitives.
Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) [RFC9901] is a specification that
introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For
an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release
(within bounds defined by the Issuer).
SD-JWT builds on JWT/JWS. It can also be used when there are no
selectively disclosable claims. However, SD-JWT itself does not
define the claims that must be used within the payload or their
semantics.
This specification uses SD-JWT and the well-established JWT content
rules and extensibility model as basis for representing Verifiable
Digital Credentials with JSON payloads. These Verifiable Digital
Credentials are called SD-JWT VCs. The use of selective disclosure
in SD-JWT VCs is optional.
SD-JWT VCs can contain claims that are registered in "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry as defined in [RFC7519], as well as public and
private claims.
1.3. Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.4. Terms and Definitions
This specification uses the terms "Holder", "Issuer", "Verifier",
"Disclosure", "Selectively Disclosable JWT (SD-JWT)", "Key Binding",
"Key Binding JWT (KB-JWT)", "Selectively Disclosable JWT with Key
Binding (SD-JWT+KB)" defined by [RFC9901].
Consumer: An application retrieving and processing documents and
resources defined in this specification, in particular the Type
Metadata specified in Section 5. This typically includes Issuers,
Verifiers, and Holders.
Publisher: An entity that publishes Type Metadata or other auxiliary
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documents referenced by an SD-JWT VC (for example via a vct URI),
but that is not necessarily the Issuer of the SD-JWT VC. A
Publisher can be a standardization body, community, ecosystem
authority, or any other party defining credential types or
associated metadata.
Verifiable Digital Credential: An assertion with claims about a
Subject that is cryptographically secured by an Issuer (usually by
a digital signature).
SD-JWT-based Verifiable Digital Credential (SD-JWT VC): A Verifiable
Digital Credential encoded using the format defined in [RFC9901].
It may or may not contain selectively disclosable claims. Note
that the three-word term “Verifiable Digital Credential” is used
to distinguish it from the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model
and to better align with preferred terminology emerging elsewhere
(see, for example, [NIST-BLOG.VDCE]). However, the “D” is omitted
in the short form “SD-JWT VC” in order to preserve the name that
has been widely used to refer to this specification since its
inception.
Unsecured Payload of an SD-JWT VC: A JSON object containing all
selectively disclosable and non-selectively disclosable claims of
the SD-JWT VC. The Unsecured Payload acts as the input JSON
object to issue an SD-JWT VC complying to this specification.
2. Verifiable Digital Credentials based on SD-JWT
This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for
SD-JWT VCs.
2.1. Media Type
SD-JWT VCs compliant with this specification MUST use the media type
application/dc+sd-jwt, where the base subtype name dc stands for
"digital credential".
2.2. Data Format
SD-JWT VC uses the SD-JWT format defined in Section 4 of [RFC9901].
Use of the JWS JSON Serialization per Section 8 of [RFC9901] for SD-
JWT VC is not precluded but the specific details are beyond the scope
of this specification.
Note that in some cases, an SD-JWT VC MAY have no selectively
disclosable claims, and therefore the encoded SD-JWT will not contain
any Disclosures.
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2.2.1. JOSE Header
This section defines JWT header parameters for the SD-JWT component
of the SD-JWT VC.
The Issuer MUST include the typ header parameter in the SD-JWT. The
typ value MUST use dc+sd-jwt. This indicates that the payload of the
SD-JWT contains plain JSON and follows the rules defined in this
specification. It further indicates that the SD-JWT is an SD-JWT
component of an SD-JWT VC.
Figure 2 is an example of a decoded SD-JWT header:
{
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "dc+sd-jwt"
}
Figure 2: Decoded SD-JWT VC Header
2.2.2. JWT Claims Set
This section defines the claims that can be included in the payload
of SD-JWT VCs.
2.2.2.1. Verifiable Digital Credential Type - vct Claim
This specification defines the new JWT claim vct (for verifiable
credential type). Its value MUST be a case-sensitive string serving
as an identifier for the type of the SD-JWT VC. The vct value MUST
be a Collision-Resistant Name as defined in Section 2 of [RFC7515].
A type is associated with rules defining which claims are permitted
or required to appear in the Unsecured Payload of the SD-JWT VC and
whether selective disclosure is permitted, necessary, or prohibited
for those claims.
This specification does not define any vct values; instead it is
expected that ecosystems using SD-JWT VCs define such values
including the semantics of the respective claims and associated rules
(e.g., policies for issuing and validating credentials beyond what is
defined in this specification).
For example, a value of https://credentials.example.com/
identity_credential can be associated with rules that define that at
least the registered JWT claims given_name, family_name, birthdate,
and address must appear in the Unsecured Payload. Additionally, the
registered JWT claims email and phone_number, and the private claims
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is_over_18, is_over_21, and is_over_65 may be used. The type might
also indicate that any of the aforementioned claims can be
selectively disclosable. The content in Figure 3 shows that vct
value used to express the example type.
{
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"given_name": "Russ",
"family_name": "Lasky",
"birthdate": "1983-07-29",
"address": {
"street_address": "285 W Huntington Dr.",
"locality": "Arcadia",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": "91007"
},
"email": "sorryfolks@parksclosed.example",
"exp": 1777707000,
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
}
}
Figure 3: Example Unsecured Payload with vct
The vct value also effectively identifies the version of the
credential type definition, as it ties a particular instance of a
credential to a specific structure, set of semantics, and rules.
When evolving a credential type without updating the version, changes
to the structure or meaning of the associated claims need to be made
in a way that preserves compatibility with existing implementations.
If a change alters the meaning of existing content, adds new required
claims, removes previously required elements, or otherwise introduces
incompatibilities, it is generally advisable to treat that as a new
version of the credential type and to convey it using a new vct
value. This allows different versions of a credential type to
coexist and helps ensure that participants interpret credentials
consistently. For example, if such a need came about for the
hypothetical type urn:example:eudi:pid:aendgard:1, a new version
could be defined using a 'vct' of urn:example:eudi:pid:aendgard:2.
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2.2.2.2. Other Credential Types - aka_vcts Claim
This specification defines the new JWT claim aka_vcts. Its value
MUST be a non-empty array of case-sensitive strings, each identifying
an additional type of the SD-JWT VC. Each value MUST be a Collision-
Resistant Name as defined in Section 2 of [RFC7515], as required for
vct values in Section 2.2.2.1. The array MUST NOT contain the value
of the vct claim of the SD-JWT VC. The order of the values in the
array is not significant and does not convey any information about
the relationships between the types.
An SD-JWT VC containing the aka_vcts claim is a Verifiable Digital
Credential of the type identified by the vct claim and, additionally,
of each of the types identified by the values in the aka_vcts claim.
Holders and Verifiers can treat the SD-JWT VC as a credential of any
of these types. This is typically used when the type identified by
the vct claim is derived from a more general type, which is then
included in the aka_vcts claim.
The aka_vcts claim is particularly useful in issuance and
presentation protocols, where the receiving party (a Holder during
issuance or a Verifier during presentation) matches the type of a
received SD-JWT VC against the type it requested or expects. While
relationships between credential types can be expressed through the
extends property in Type Metadata, Type Metadata is optional and may
not be available, so issuance and presentation protocols cannot
always rely on it for type matching. For example, a Verifier
requesting a credential of the hypothetical type urn:example:eudi:pid
that receives an SD-JWT VC with a vct value of
urn:example:eudi:pid:aendgard:1 can determine from an aka_vcts value
of ["urn:example:eudi:pid"] that the received credential is also of
the requested type.
The content in Figure 4 shows an excerpt of an Unsecured Payload
using the aka_vcts claim to express this example.
{
"vct": "urn:example:eudi:pid:aendgard:1",
"aka_vcts": [
"urn:example:eudi:pid"
]
}
Figure 4: Example Unsecured Payload excerpt with aka_vcts
Note that the aka_vcts claim is asserted by the Issuer and, like the
vct claim, is only as trustworthy as the Issuer itself.
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The aka_vcts claim is independent of Type Metadata Section 5 and, in
particular, orthogonal to the extends property: the claim can be used
whether or not Type Metadata exists for any of the listed types, and
the listed types are not required to be related to the type of the
SD-JWT VC through the extends property. The interaction between the
aka_vcts claim and Type Metadata using the extends property is
described in Section 5.4.
2.2.2.3. Registered JWT Claims
SD-JWT VCs MAY use any claim registered in the "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry as defined in [RFC7519].
The following registered JWT claims, including any of their sub-
claims, when used in the SD-JWT component of an SD-JWT VC, MUST NOT
be included in Disclosures and therefore MUST NOT be selectively
disclosed:
* iss: OPTIONAL. As defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7519] this
claim explicitly indicates the Issuer of the Verifiable Digital
Credential when it is not conveyed by other means (e.g., the
subject of the end-entity certificate of an x5c header).
* nbf: OPTIONAL. The time before which the Verifiable Digital
Credential MUST NOT be accepted before validating. See [RFC7519]
for more information.
* exp: OPTIONAL. The expiry time of the Verifiable Digital
Credential after which the Verifiable Digital Credential is no
longer valid. See [RFC7519] for more information.
* cnf: OPTIONAL unless cryptographic Key Binding is to be supported,
in which case it is REQUIRED. Contains the confirmation method
identifying the proof of possession key as defined in [RFC7800].
It is RECOMMENDED that this contains a JWK as defined in
Section 3.2 of [RFC7800]. For proof of cryptographic Key Binding,
the KB-JWT in the presentation of the SD-JWT MUST be secured by
the key identified in this claim.
* vct: REQUIRED. The type of the Verifiable Digital Credential,
e.g., https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential, as
defined in Section 2.2.2.1.
* vct#integrity: OPTIONAL. The hash of the Type Metadata document
to provide integrity as defined in Section 6.
* aka_vcts: OPTIONAL. An array of additional types of the
Verifiable Digital Credential, as defined in Section 2.2.2.2.
* status: OPTIONAL. The information on how to read the status of
the Verifiable Credential. See [I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list] for
more information. When the status claim is present and using the
status_list mechanism, the associated Status List Token MUST be in
JWT format.
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The following registered JWT claims are used within the SD-JWT
component of the SD-JWT VC and MAY be included in Disclosures, i.e.,
can be selectively disclosed:
* sub: OPTIONAL. The identifier of the Subject of the Verifiable
Digital Credential. The Issuer MAY use it to provide the Subject
identifier known by the Issuer. There is no requirement for a
binding to exist between sub and cnf claims.
* iat: OPTIONAL. The time of issuance of the Verifiable Digital
Credential. See [RFC7519] for more information.
2.2.2.4. Public and Private JWT claims
Additionally, any public and private claims as defined in Sections
4.2 and 4.3 of [RFC7519] MAY be used.
Binary data in claims SHOULD be encoded as data URIs as defined in
[RFC2397]. Exceptions can be made when data formats are used that
already define a text encoding suitable for use in JSON or where an
established text encoding is commonly used. For example, images
would make use of data URIs, whereas hash digests in base64 encoding
do not need to be encoded as such.
An example of a claim containing binary data encoded as a data URI is
shown in Appendix A.1.
2.2.2.5. SD-JWT VC without Selectively Disclosable Claims
An SD-JWT VC MAY have no selectively disclosable claims. In that
case, the SD-JWT VC MUST NOT contain the _sd claim in the JWT body.
It also MUST NOT have any Disclosures.
2.3. Example
2.3.1. Issuance
Figure 5 is an example of the user data of an Unsecured Payload of an
SD-JWT VC.
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{
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"given_name": "John",
"family_name": "Doe",
"email": "johndoe@example.com",
"phone_number": "+1-202-555-0101",
"address": {
"street_address": "123 Main St",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
},
"birthdate": "1940-01-01",
"is_over_18": true,
"is_over_21": true,
"is_over_65": true
}
Figure 5: Unsecured Payload Example
Figure 6 shows how the Unsecured Payload above can be used in an SD-
JWT where the resulting SD-JWT VC contains only claims about the
Subject that are selectively disclosable:
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{
"_sd": [
"09vKrJMOlyTWM0sjpu_pdOBVBQ2M1y3KhpH515nXkpY",
"2rsjGbaC0ky8mT0pJrPioWTq0_daw1sX76poUlgCwbI",
"EkO8dhW0dHEJbvUHlE_VCeuC9uRELOieLZhh7XbUTtA",
"IlDzIKeiZdDwpqpK6ZfbyphFvz5FgnWa-sN6wqQXCiw",
"JzYjH4svliH0R3PyEMfeZu6Jt69u5qehZo7F7EPYlSE",
"PorFbpKuVu6xymJagvkFsFXAbRoc2JGlAUA2BA4o7cI",
"TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo",
"jdrTE8YcbY4EifugihiAe_BPekxJQZICeiUQwY9QqxI",
"jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4"
],
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"_sd_alg": "sha-256",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
}
}
Figure 6: Unsecured Payload Example
Note that a cnf claim has been added to the SD-JWT payload to express
the confirmation method of the Key Binding.
The following are the Disclosures belonging to the SD-JWT payload
above:
*Claim given_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4
* Disclosure:
WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiSm9o
biJd
* Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "given_name", "John"]
*Claim family_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo
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* Disclosure:
WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkRv
ZSJd
* Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "family_name", "Doe"]
*Claim email*:
* SHA-256 Hash: JzYjH4svliH0R3PyEMfeZu6Jt69u5qehZo7F7EPYlSE
* Disclosure:
WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImVtYWlsIiwgImpvaG5kb2VA
ZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXQ
* Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "email",
"johndoe@example.com"]
*Claim phone_number*:
* SHA-256 Hash: PorFbpKuVu6xymJagvkFsFXAbRoc2JGlAUA2BA4o7cI
* Disclosure:
WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInBob25lX251bWJlciIsICIr
MS0yMDItNTU1LTAxMDEiXQ
* Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "phone_number",
"+1-202-555-0101"]
*Claim address*:
* SHA-256 Hash: IlDzIKeiZdDwpqpK6ZfbyphFvz5FgnWa-sN6wqQXCiw
* Disclosure:
WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVl
dF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRv
d24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMifV0
* Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "address", {"street_address":
"123 Main St", "locality": "Anytown", "region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"}]
*Claim birthdate*:
* SHA-256 Hash: jdrTE8YcbY4EifugihiAe_BPekxJQZICeiUQwY9QqxI
* Disclosure:
WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTQw
LTAxLTAxIl0
* Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "birthdate", "1940-01-01"]
*Claim is_over_18*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 09vKrJMOlyTWM0sjpu_pdOBVBQ2M1y3KhpH515nXkpY
* Disclosure:
WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMTgiLCB0cnVl
XQ
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* Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "is_over_18", true]
*Claim is_over_21*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 2rsjGbaC0ky8mT0pJrPioWTq0_daw1sX76poUlgCwbI
* Disclosure:
WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMjEiLCB0cnVl
XQ
* Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "is_over_21", true]
*Claim is_over_65*:
* SHA-256 Hash: EkO8dhW0dHEJbvUHlE_VCeuC9uRELOieLZhh7XbUTtA
* Disclosure:
WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLCB0cnVl
XQ
* Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "is_over_65", true]
The SD-JWT and the Disclosures would then be serialized by the Issuer
into the format shown in Figure 7 for issuance to the Holder.
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eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCIsICJraWQiOiAiZG9jLXNp
Z25lci0wNS0yNS0yMDIyIn0.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dktySk1PbHlUV00wc2pwdV9wZE9C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.EO_qz
bkRHC_Kyzfd3yQiL3uNzuwfJ1MR3-i-YIXg82Y4ar7m8i0ksfqhsy3RzEhKro9MJf7F6
iuJipJ78MWD_w~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLC
AiSm9obiJd~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgI
kRvZSJd~WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImVtYWlsIiwgImpvaG5kb2VA
ZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXQ~WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInBob25lX251b
WJlciIsICIrMS0yMDItNTU1LTAxMDEiXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIi
wgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2
FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOi
AiVVMifV0~WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOT
QwLTAxLTAxIl0~WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMTgiLC
B0cnVlXQ~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMjEiLCB0cnV
lXQ~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLCB0cnVlXQ~
Figure 7: SD-JWT VC Example
2.3.2. Presentation
Figure 8 is an example of a presentation of the SD-JWT shown in
Section 2.3 including a KB-JWT. In this presentation, the Holder
provides only the Disclosures for the address and is_over_65 claims.
Other claims are not disclosed to the Verifier.
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eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCIsICJraWQiOiAiZG9jLXNp
Z25lci0wNS0yNS0yMDIyIn0.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dktySk1PbHlUV00wc2pwdV9wZE9C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.EO_qz
bkRHC_Kyzfd3yQiL3uNzuwfJ1MR3-i-YIXg82Y4ar7m8i0ksfqhsy3RzEhKro9MJf7F6
iuJipJ78MWD_w~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLC
B0cnVlXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmV
ldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCA
icmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMifV0~eyJhbGciOiAiRVM
yNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJub25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgImF1ZC
I6ICJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3ZlcmlmaWVyIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3ODgyMDk5Nz
gsICJzZF9oYXNoIjogIlhSQUhCTjhRa0JQMm1mYUh3bmhnV3BvTG1haS1JNElnX2hSNm
FadWJLTjAifQ.P3Stdkgrv_Q46LpQBzLJBP1mnryWb-4FJoOpi2vwOT0_HBy4h3gWZNf
NAUWmM1ZQK4yBoLkUzQqzkWmXZuKKUw
Figure 8: Presented SD-JWT+KB Example
After validation, the Verifier will have the processed SD-JWT payload
in Figure 9 available for further handling.
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{
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
},
"is_over_65": true,
"address": {
"street_address": "123 Main St",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
}
}
Figure 9: Verified SD-JWT Payload Example
The example in Figure 10 shows a presentation of a (similar but
different) SD-JWT without a KB-JWT.
eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dkt
ySk1PbHlUV00wc2pwdV9wZE9CVkJRMk0xeTNLaHBINTE1blhrcFkiLCAiMnJzakdiYUM
wa3k4bVQwcEpyUGlvV1RxMF9kYXcxc1g3NnBvVWxnQ3diSSIsICJFa084ZGhXMGRIRUp
idlVIbEVfVkNldUM5dVJFTE9pZUxaaGg3WGJVVHRBIiwgIklsRHpJS2VpWmREd3BxcEs
2WmZieXBoRnZ6NUZnbldhLXNONndxUVhDaXciLCAiSnpZakg0c3ZsaUgwUjNQeUVNZmV
adTZKdDY5dTVxZWhabzdGN0VQWWxTRSIsICJQb3JGYnBLdVZ1Nnh5bUphZ3ZrRnNGWEF
iUm9jMkpHbEFVQTJCQTRvN2NJIiwgIlRHZjRvTGJnd2Q1SlFhSHlLVlFaVTlVZEdFMHc
1cnREc3JaemZVYW9tTG8iLCAiamRyVEU4WWNiWTRFaWZ1Z2loaUFlX0JQZWt4SlFaSUN
laVVRd1k5UXF4SSIsICJqc3U5eVZ1bHdRUWxoRmxNXzNKbHpNYVNGemdsaFFHMERwZmF
5UXdMVUs0Il0sICJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1ZXIiLCAiaWF
0IjogMTY4MzAwMDAwMCwgImV4cCI6IDE4ODMwMDAwMDAsICJ2Y3QiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9
jcmVkZW50aWFscy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pZGVudGl0eV9jcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIl9zZF9
hbGciOiAic2hhLTI1NiJ9.NpdjRPpZ4naL6ceMyUZ_JpqHJq8M5pRL1TOTUeKtv8niRG
Tc_UpjCn5AVPUz6omZDmGX5wTpLrEiOKyjNPkaAQ~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5
JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLCB0cnVlXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9B
IiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxv
Y2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnki
OiAiVVMifV0~
Figure 10: Presented SD-JWT Example
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The Verifier will have the following processed SD-JWT payload shown
in Figure 11 after validation.
{
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"is_over_65": true,
"address": {
"street_address": "123 Main St",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
}
}
Figure 11: Processed SD-JWT Payload Example
2.4. Verification and Processing
The recipient (Holder or Verifier) of an SD-JWT VC MUST process and
verify an SD-JWT VC as described in Section 7 of [RFC9901]. The
check in point 2.c of Section 7.1 of [RFC9901], which validates the
Issuer and ensures that the signing key belongs to the Issuer, MUST
be satisfied by determining and validating the public verification
key used to verify the Issuer-signed JWT, employing a key discovery
and validation mechanism (defined in Section 2.5) that is permitted
for the Issuer according to policy.
If Key Binding is required (refer to the security considerations in
Section 9.5 of [RFC9901]), the Verifier MUST verify the KB-JWT
according to Section 7.3 of [RFC9901]. To verify the KB-JWT, the cnf
claim of the SD-JWT MUST be used.
After the processed SD-JWT payload is available to the recipient, a
Holder or Verifier MAY process Type Metadata as described in
Section 5.7. If Type Metadata is processed, the rules defined in
Section 5.7 apply and can require the SD-JWT VC to be rejected.
If there are no selectively disclosable claims, there is no need to
process the _sd claim nor any Disclosures.
If status is present in the verified payload of the SD-JWT, the
status SHOULD be checked. Verifier policy decides whether to reject
or accept a presentation of a SD-JWT VC based on the status of the
Verifiable Digital Credential.
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Additional validation rules MAY apply, but their use is out of the
scope of this specification.
2.5. Issuer Verification Key Discovery and Validation
A key discovery and validation mechanism defines how a Verifier
determines the appropriate key and associated procedure for verifying
the signature of an Issuer-signed JWT. This allows for flexibility
in supporting different trust anchoring systems and key resolution
methods without changing the core processing model.
A recipient MUST determine and validate the public verification key
for the Issuer-signed JWT using a supported key discovery and
validation mechanism that is permitted for the given Issuer according
to policy. This specification defines the following two mechanisms:
* JWT VC Issuer Metadata: A mechanism to retrieve the Issuer's
public key using web-based resolution. When the value of the iss
claim of the Issuer-signed JWT is an HTTPS URI, the recipient
obtains the public key using the keys from JWT VC Issuer Metadata
as defined in Section 4.
* Inline X.509 Certificates: A mechanism to retrieve the Issuer's
public key using the X.509 certificate chain in the SD-JWT header.
When the protected header of the Issuer-signed JWT contains the
x5c parameter, the recipient uses the public key from the end-
entity certificate of the certificates from that x5c parameter and
validates the X.509 certificate chain accordingly. In this case,
the Issuer of the Verifiable Digital Credential is the subject of
the end-entity certificate.
To enable different trust anchoring systems or key resolution
methods, separate specifications or ecosystem regulations may define
additional key discovery and validation mechanisms that complement or
override those defined above; however, the specifics of such
mechanisms are out of scope for this specification. See Section 7.3
for related security considerations.
If a recipient cannot validate that the public verification key
corresponds to the Issuer of the Issuer-signed JWT using a permitted
key discovery and validation mechanism, the SD-JWT VC MUST be
rejected.
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3. Retrieving Documents and Resources via HTTP
This specification defines several documents and resources that a
Consumer retrieves via HTTP URLs: the JWT VC Issuer Metadata
configuration and the JWK Set referenced by jwks_uri Section 4, Type
Metadata documents referenced by vct claims and extends properties
Section 5.3, and rendering resources such as logos, background
images, and SVG templates Section 5.5.1. The requirements in this
section apply to every such retrieval.
HTTP requests and responses used with this specification are governed
by HTTP semantics [RFC9110] and HTTP caching [RFC9111]. A document
or resource is retrieved by sending an HTTP GET request to its URL.
A successful response carries a representation of the requested
document or resource as its content; the expected media type of that
representation is defined in the section defining the respective
document or resource. A Consumer MUST NOT use the content of an
error response (a response with a 4xx or 5xx status code) in place of
the requested document or resource.
All URLs dereferenced according to this specification MUST use the
HTTPS scheme. As an exception, the rendering resource URIs defined
in Section 5.5.1 MAY alternatively be data: URIs [RFC2397], which
embed the resource and do not involve any retrieval.
A server can respond to a request with an HTTP redirect (a 3xx status
code, see Section 15.4 of [RFC9110]). A Consumer that follows
redirects MUST limit the number of redirects followed for a single
retrieval, MUST NOT follow redirects to URLs not using the HTTPS
scheme, and MUST apply the URL validation described in Section 7.1 to
every URL it connects to, i.e., to the originally dereferenced URL as
well as to every redirect target.
Consumers MUST perform each retrieval in a time-bound and size-bound
manner to prevent resource exhaustion and denial-of-service attacks,
and MUST validate that the response content conforms to the format
defined for the respective document or resource before processing it.
Unless a document can be cached indefinitely based on integrity
metadata as described in Section 5.3.4, the freshness and reuse of
retrieved documents and resources is governed by the HTTP caching
model [RFC9111]. Issuers and Publishers SHOULD include an explicit
freshness lifetime (e.g., a Cache-Control: max-age response
directive) in their responses.
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4. JWT VC Issuer Metadata
This specification defines the JWT VC Issuer Metadata to retrieve the
JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration of the Issuer of the SD-JWT VC.
The Issuer is identified by the iss claim in the JWT. Use of the JWT
VC Issuer Metadata is OPTIONAL.
Issuers publishing JWT VC Issuer Metadata MUST make a JWT VC Issuer
Metadata configuration available at the location formed by inserting
the well-known string /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer between the host
component and the path component (if any) of the iss claim value in
the JWT. The iss MUST be a case-sensitive URL using the HTTPS scheme
that contains scheme, host and, optionally, port number and path
components as defined in [RFC3986], but no query or fragment
components.
4.1. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Request
A JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration MUST be queried using an HTTP
GET request at the path defined in Section 4, following the rules
defined in Section 3.
Figure 12 is an example of an HTTP request for the JWT VC Issuer
Metadata configuration when iss is set to https://example.com:
GET /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Figure 12: Example HTTP Request for JWT VC Issuer Metadata
If the iss value contains a path component, any terminating / MUST be
removed before inserting /.well-known/ and the well-known URI suffix
between the host component and the path component.
Figure 13 is an example of an HTTP request for the JWT VC Issuer
Metadata configuration when iss is set to https://example.com/
tenant/1234:
GET /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer/tenant/1234 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Figure 13: Example HTTP Request for JWT VC Issuer Metadata
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4.2. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Response
A successful response carries a representation of the JWT VC Issuer
Metadata configuration as its content, using the application/json
media type. The general requirements for HTTP retrieval defined in
Section 3 apply.
This specification defines the following JWT VC Issuer Metadata
configuration parameters:
* issuer: REQUIRED. The Issuer identifier, which MUST be identical
to the iss value in the JWT.
* jwks_uri: OPTIONAL. URL string referencing the Issuer's JSON Web
Key (JWK) Set [RFC7517] document which contains the Issuer's
public keys. The value of this field MUST point to a valid JWK
Set document. The JWK Set document is retrieved as described in
Section 3; its format and further processing are defined in
[RFC7517].
* jwks: OPTIONAL. Issuer's JSON Web Key Set [RFC7517] document
value, which contains the Issuer's public keys. The value of this
field MUST be a JSON object containing a valid JWK Set.
JWT VC Issuer Metadata MUST include either jwks_uri or jwks in their
JWT VC Issuer Metadata, but not both.
It is RECOMMENDED that the Issuer-signed JWT contains a kid JWT
header parameter that can be used to look up the public key in the
JWK Set included by value or referenced in the JWT VC Issuer
Metadata.
Figure 14 is an example of an HTTP response carrying a JWT VC Issuer
Metadata configuration including jwks:
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: max-age=3600
{
"issuer":"https://example.com",
"jwks":{
"keys":[
{
"kid":"doc-signer-05-25-2022",
"kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256",
"x": "b28d4MwZMjw8-00CG4xfnn9SLMVMM19SlqZpVb_uNtQ",
"y": "Xv5zWwuoaTgdS6hV43yI6gBwTnjukmFQQnJ_kCxzqk8"
},
{
"kid":"doc-signer-06-05-2025",
"kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256",
"x":"DfjUx4WHBds61vGbqUQhsy3FGX13fAS13QWh2EHIkX8",
"y":"NfqJt9Kp0EA93xq9ysO80DRZ_hCGlISz-pYLgv4RFvg"
}
]
}
}
Figure 14: Example HTTP Response with Metadata including a JSON
Web Key Set
Figure 15 is an example of a JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration
including jwks_uri:
{
"issuer":"https://example.com",
"jwks_uri":"https://jwt-vc-issuer.example.com/my_public_keys.jwks"
}
Figure 15: Example Metadata with a JSON Web Key Set URI
Additional JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration parameters MAY also
be used.
4.3. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Validation
The issuer value returned MUST be identical to the iss value of the
Issuer-signed JWT. If these values are not identical, the data
contained in the response MUST NOT be used.
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5. SD-JWT VC Type Metadata
An SD-JWT VC type, i.e., the vct value, is associated with Type
Metadata defining, for example, information about the type and how
credentials are displayed.
This section defines Type Metadata that can be associated with a type
of an SD-JWT VC, as well as a method for retrieving the Type Metadata
and processing rules. This Type Metadata is intended to be used,
among other things, for the following purposes:
* Developers of Issuers and Verifiers can use the Type Metadata to
understand the semantics of the type and the associated rules.
While in some cases, Issuers are the parties that define types,
this is not always the case. For example, a type can be defined
by a standardization body or a community.
* Verifiers can use the Type Metadata to determine whether a
credential is valid according to the rules of the type. For
example, a Verifier can check whether a credential contains all
required claims and whether the claims are selectively
disclosable.
* Holders can use the metadata to display the credential in a way
that is consistent with the intent of the provider of the Type
Metadata.
Type Metadata can be retrieved as described in Section 5.3.
Ecosystems can define rules for a vct value that specify whether Type
Metadata is to be processed and which Type Metadata retrieval methods
Consumers are expected to support.
5.1. Type Metadata Example
This section only shows excerpts, the full examples can be found in
Appendix A.2.
The following in Figure 16 is an example of an SD-JWT VC payload,
containing a vct claim with the value
https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42.
{
"vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42",
"vct#integrity":
"sha256-vJKakJAQkDYkIhGrT1M3nxRuSj9udH0l1PXB06QHto8=",
...
}
Figure 16: Example SD-JWT VC Payload with vct Claim
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Type Metadata for the type
https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42 can be
retrieved using various mechanisms as described in Section 5.3. For
this example, the vct value is a URL as defined in Section 5.3.1 and
the Type Metadata document in Figure 17 is retrieved from it:
{
"vct":"https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42",
"name":"Betelgeuse Education Credential - Version 42",
"description":"This is our education credential. Don't panic.",
"extends":"https://galaxy.example.com/galactic-education-credential/v2",
"extends#integrity":
"sha256-ilOUJsTultOwLfz7QUcFALaRa3BP/jelX1ds04kB9yU="
}
Figure 17: Example Type Metadata Document
Note: The hash of the Type Metadata document shown in the second
example must be equal to the one in the vct#integrity claim in the
SD-JWT VC payload, vJKakJAQkDYkIhGrT1M3nxRuSj9udH0l1PXB06QHto8= (see
Section 6 for details).
5.2. Type Metadata Format
The Type Metadata document MUST be a JSON object. The following
properties are defined:
* vct: REQUIRED. The verifiable digital credential type described
by this type metadata document.
* name: OPTIONAL. A human-readable name for the type, intended for
developers reading the JSON document.
* description: OPTIONAL. A human-readable description for the type,
intended for developers reading the JSON document.
* extends: OPTIONAL. A URI of another type that this type extends,
as described in Section 5.4.
* display: An array of objects containing display information for
the type, as described in Section 5.5. This property is OPTIONAL.
* claims: An array of objects containing claim information for the
type, as described in Section 5.6. This property is OPTIONAL.
Additionally, extends#integrity MAY be present as defined in
Section 6.
A Type Metadata document MAY contain additional top level or
subordinate properties. Consumers MUST ignore properties that are
not understood.
An example of a Type Metadata document is shown in Appendix A.2.
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5.3. Retrieving Type Metadata
A Consumer retrieving Type Metadata MUST ensure that the vct value in
the SD-JWT VC payload is identical to the vct value in the reference
to the Type Metadata (either in the SD-JWT VC itself or in an extends
property in a Type Metadata document).
If the claim vct#integrity is present in the SD-JWT VC, its value
MUST be an "integrity metadata" string as defined in Section 6.
The following sections define methods to retrieve Type Metadata.
5.3.1. From a URL in the vct Claim
A URI in the vct claim can be used to express a type. If the type is
a URL using the HTTPS scheme, Type Metadata might be retrievable from
that URL, and it is at the consumer's discretion whether to attempt
retrieve Type Metadata from the URL.
The Type Metadata is retrieved from that URL using an HTTP GET
request, following the rules defined in Section 3. A successful
response carries a JSON object as defined in Section 5.2 as its
content, using the application/json media type.
5.3.2. From a Registry
A Consumer MAY use a registry to retrieve Type Metadata for a SD-JWT
VC type, e.g., if the type is not an HTTPS URL or if the Consumer
does not have access to the URL. A Consumer needs to trust the
registry to provide correct Type Metadata for the type.
The registry MUST provide the Type Metadata in the same format as
described in Section 5.2.
5.3.3. Using a Defined Retrieval Method
Ecosystems MAY define additional methods for retrieving Type
Metadata. For example, a standardization body or a community MAY
define a service which has to be used to retrieve Type Metadata based
on a URN in the vct claim.
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5.3.4. From a Local Cache
A Consumer MAY cache Type Metadata for an SD-JWT VC type. If a hash
for integrity protection is present for the Type Metadata as defined
in Section 6, the Consumer MAY assume that the Type Metadata is
static and cache it indefinitely, keyed by the integrity metadata
value. Because the integrity metadata uniquely identifies the
content of the document, such a cache MAY be used regardless of any
caching directives (such as no-store) in the HTTP response.
Otherwise, the Consumer MUST determine how long the Type Metadata can
be cached and reused according to the HTTP caching model defined in
[RFC9111]. Publishers SHOULD therefore include an explicit freshness
lifetime (e.g., a Cache-Control: max-age response directive) in Type
Metadata responses, as described in Section 3.
5.4. Extending Type Metadata
An SD-JWT VC type can extend another type. The extended type is
identified by the URI in the extends property. Consumers MUST
retrieve and process Type Metadata for the extended type before
processing the Type Metadata for the extending type.
The extended type MAY itself extend another type. This can be used
to create a chain or hierarchy of types. The security considerations
described in Section 7.4 apply in order to avoid problems with
circular dependencies.
The extends property and the aka_vcts claim defined in
Section 2.2.2.2 are orthogonal mechanisms, and Type Metadata does not
add any requirements to the content of the aka_vcts claim. However,
if Type Metadata exists both for the type in the vct claim and for a
type listed in the aka_vcts claim, the type of the SD-JWT VC SHOULD
extend the listed type, whether directly or transitively. A Consumer
processing Type Metadata MAY use the types established via the
extends property in addition to those in the aka_vcts claim when
matching types.
Processing details when extending type metadata are described in
Section 5.5.2 and Section 5.6.5.
5.5. Display Metadata
The display property is an array containing display information for
the type. The array contains an object for each locale that is
supported by the type. The consuming application uses the object
containing the language tag it considers most appropriate for the
user.
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The objects in the array have the following properties:
* locale: A language tag as defined in Section 2 of [RFC5646]. This
property is REQUIRED.
* name: A human-readable name for the type, intended for end users.
This property is REQUIRED.
* description: A human-readable description for the type, intended
for end users. This property is OPTIONAL.
* rendering: An object containing rendering information for the
type, as described in Section 5.5.1. This property is OPTIONAL.
5.5.1. Rendering Metadata
The rendering property is an object containing rendering information
for the type. The object MUST contain a property for each rendering
method that is supported by the type. The property name MUST be a
rendering method identifier and the property value MUST be an object
containing the properties defined for the rendering method.
The uri properties defined for the rendering methods below MUST be
either HTTPS URLs or data: URIs [RFC2397]. A resource referenced by
an HTTPS URL, including an SVG template, is retrieved as described in
Section 3; the requirements defined there, including those on
redirects, time and size bounds, and URL validation, apply to these
retrievals. Logo and background images are expected to be served
with an appropriate image media type (e.g., image/png), and SVG
templates with the image/svg+xml media type.
5.5.1.1. Rendering Method "simple"
The simple rendering method is intended for use in applications that
do not support SVG rendering. The object contains the following
properties:
* logo: An object containing information about the logo to be
displayed for the type, as described in Section 5.5.1.1.1. This
property is OPTIONAL.
* background_image: An object containing information about the
background image to be displayed for the type, as described in
Section 5.5.1.1.2. This property is OPTIONAL.
* background_color: An RGB color value as defined in [W3C.CSS-COLOR]
for the background of the credential. This property is OPTIONAL.
* text_color: An RGB color value as defined in [W3C.CSS-COLOR] value
for the text of the credential. This property is OPTIONAL.
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5.5.1.1.1. Logo Metadata
The logo property is an object containing information about the logo
to be displayed for the type. The object contains the following
properties:
* uri: A URI pointing to the logo image. This property is REQUIRED.
* uri#integrity: An "integrity metadata" string as described in
Section 6. This property is OPTIONAL.
* alt_text: A string containing alternative text for the logo image.
This property is OPTIONAL.
5.5.1.1.2. Background Image Metadata
The background_image property is an object containing information
about the background image to be displayed for the type. The object
contains the following properties:
* uri: A URI pointing to the background image. This property is
REQUIRED.
* uri#integrity: An "integrity metadata" string as described in
Section 6. This property is OPTIONAL.
5.5.1.2. Rendering Method "svg_templates"
The svg_templates rendering method is intended for use in
applications that support SVG rendering. svg_templates MUST contain
an array of objects containing information about the SVG templates
available for the type. Each object contains the following
properties:
* uri: A URI pointing to the SVG template. This property is
REQUIRED.
* uri#integrity: An "integrity metadata" string as described in
Section 6. This property is OPTIONAL.
* properties: An object containing properties for the SVG template,
as described in Section 5.5.1.2.1. This property is REQUIRED if
more than one SVG template is present, otherwise it is OPTIONAL.
5.5.1.2.1. SVG Template Properties
The properties property is an object containing properties for the
SVG template. Consuming applications MUST use these properties to
find the best SVG template available for display to the user based on
the display properties (landscape/portrait) and user preferences
(color scheme, contrast). The object MUST contain at least one of
the following properties:
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* orientation: The orientation for which the SVG template is
optimized, with valid values being portrait and landscape. This
property is OPTIONAL.
* color_scheme: The color scheme for which the SVG template is
optimized, with valid values being light and dark. This property
is OPTIONAL.
* contrast: The contrast for which the SVG template is optimized,
with valid values being normal and high. This property is
OPTIONAL.
5.5.1.2.2. SVG Rendering
A consuming application MUST preprocess the SVG template by replacing
placeholders in the SVG template with properly escaped values of the
claims in the credential. The placeholders MUST be defined in the
SVG template using the syntax {{svg_id}}, where svg_id is an
identifier defined in the claim metadata as described in Section 5.6.
Placeholders MUST only be used in the text content of the SVG
template and MUST NOT be used in any other part of the SVG template,
e.g., in attributes or comments.
A consuming application MUST ensure that all special characters in
the claim values are properly escaped before inserting them into the
SVG template. At least the following characters MUST be escaped:
* & as &
* < as <
* > as >
* " as "
* ' as '
If the svg_id is not present in the claim metadata, the consuming
application SHOULD reject and not render the SVG template. If the
svg_id is present in the claim metadata, but the claim is not present
in the credential, the placeholder MUST be replaced with an empty
string or a string appropriate to indicate that the value is absent.
The example in Figure 18 shows a minimal SVG with one placeholder
using the svg_id value address_street_address which is defined in the
example in Appendix A.2.
Figure 18: Example SVG Template with Placeholder
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See Section 7.10 for SVG template rendering security considerations.
5.5.2. Extending Display Metadata
When an SD-JWT VC type extends another type as described in
Section 5.4, the display metadata remains valid for the inheriting
type unless that type defines its own display property, in which case
the original display metadata is ignored.
Note that this does not affect the display properties in the claim
metadata. Rules for these are defined in Section 5.6.5.
5.6. Claim Metadata
The claims property is an array of objects that provides per-claim
metadata. Each object identifies which claim or set of claims in the
credential is being described (path), and can specify how that claim
is presented to end users (display), whether it is required to be
included by the Issuer (mandatory), whether it is selectively
disclosable (sd), and, for SVG rendering, which placeholder refers to
it (svg_id).
The array MAY contain an object for each claim that is supported by
the type. Each object contains the following properties:
* path: An array indicating the claim or claims that are being
addressed, as described below. This property is REQUIRED.
* display: An array containing display information for the claim or
claims that are being addressed, as described in Section 5.6.2.
This property is OPTIONAL.
* mandatory: A boolean indicating that the claim must be present in
the issued credential. This property is OPTIONAL. If omitted,
the default value is false. See Section 5.6.3 for details.
* sd: A string indicating whether the claim is selectively
disclosable, as described in Section 5.6.4. This property is
OPTIONAL.
* svg_id: A string defining the ID of the claim for reference in the
SVG template, as described in Section 5.5.1.2.2. The ID MUST be
unique within the type metadata. It MUST consist of only
alphanumeric characters and underscores and MUST NOT start with a
digit. This property is OPTIONAL.
When a Consumer processes Type Metadata for an SD-JWT VC, the claims
property and each claim metadata object MUST conform to the structure
defined in this section and its subsections; otherwise, claim
metadata processing fails. Properties that are not understood are
ignored as defined in Section 5.2.
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When a Holder or Verifier processes claim metadata for an SD-JWT VC,
it MUST validate the processed SD-JWT payload against the claim
metadata in the Type Metadata after applying any extensions as
described in Section 5.6.5. Claim metadata validation fails if any
of the following applies:
* Processing a path results in an error as defined in Section 5.6.1.
* The Holder or Verifier can determine that a claim addressed by a
claim metadata object with mandatory set to true was not included
in the issued credential (see Section 5.6.3).
* A claim selected by a claim metadata object's path is not
selectively disclosable as required by its sd value (see
Section 5.6.4).
Whether a mandatory claim was included can be determined by a Holder
that has all Disclosures by evaluating the path against the complete
Unsecured Payload. A Verifier MUST NOT treat absence of a
selectively disclosable claim from a presentation as evidence that
the Issuer failed to include a mandatory claim.
When evaluating a path for this validation, the following applies:
* A claim is selectively disclosable at a path if it is directly
represented as a Disclosure for an object property or array
element in the SD-JWT; it is not selectively disclosable solely
because one of its ancestors is.
* Non-negative integer and null components of a path are evaluated
against the array as issued, counting array elements that are not
disclosed and are therefore absent from the processed SD-JWT
payload (see Section 5.6.1).
* If a path selects an array element that is not disclosed, that
element was included in the issued credential and is selectively
disclosable; its contents are unknown, so any deeper path
components select no claims.
Performing this validation requires the Holder or Verifier to retain
sufficient information during SD-JWT processing, including the
positions of array elements that are not disclosed. See Section 5.7
for the consequences of claim metadata processing and validation
failures.
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5.6.1. Claim Path
The path property MUST be a non-empty array of strings, null values,
or non-negative integers. It is used to select a particular claim in
the credential or a set of claims. A string indicates that the
respective key is to be selected, a null value indicates that all
elements of the currently selected array(s) are to be selected, and a
non-negative integer indicates that the respective index in an array
is to be selected.
5.6.1.1. Example
Figure 19 shows a reduced example of a credential.
{
"vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42",
"name": "Arthur Dent",
"address": {
"street_address": "42 Market Street",
"city": "Milliways",
"postal_code": "12345"
},
"degrees": [
{
"type": "Bachelor of Science",
"university": "University of Betelgeuse"
},
{
"type": "Master of Science",
"university": "University of Betelgeuse"
}
],
"nationalities": ["British", "Betelgeusian"]
}
Figure 19: Example Credential for Claim Path
The following shows examples of path values and the respective
selected claims in the credential above:
* ["name"]: The claim name with the value Arthur Dent is selected.
* ["address"]: The claim address with its sub-claims as the value is
selected.
* ["address", "street_address"]: The claim street_address with the
value 42 Market Street is selected.
* ["degrees", null, "type"]: All type claims in the degrees array
are selected.
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The example in Appendix A.2 shows how the path can be used to address
arrays and their elements.
5.6.1.2. Processing of path
In detail, the array components of path are processed from left to
right as follows:
1. Select the root element of the credential, i.e., the top-level
JSON object.
2. Process the path components from left to right:
1. If the path component is a string, select the element in the
respective key in the currently selected element(s). If any
of the currently selected element(s) is not an object, abort
processing and return an error. If the key does not exist in
an element currently selected, remove that element from the
selection.
2. If the path component is null, select all elements of the
currently selected array(s). If any of the currently
selected element(s) is not an array, abort processing and
return an error.
3. If the path component is a non-negative integer, select the
element at the respective index in the currently selected
array(s). If any of the currently selected element(s) is not
an array, abort processing and return an error. If the index
does not exist in a selected array, remove that array from
the selection.
3. If the set of elements currently selected is empty, the result of
processing is the empty set.
The result of the processing is the set of elements to which the
respective claim metadata applies.
The path property MUST point to the respective claim as if all
selectively disclosable claims were disclosed to a Verifier. That
means that a consuming application which does not have access to all
disclosures may not be able to identify the claim which is being
addressed.
Note: This specification intentionally does not use JSON Pointer
[RFC6901] for selecting claims, as JSON Pointer requires string
parsing and does not support wildcard selection of array elements.
It does not use JSON Path [RFC9535] as that introduces a considerable
complexity and brings in many features which are not needed for the
use case of selecting claims in a credential. There are also
security concerns with some implementations.
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5.6.2. Claim Display Metadata
The display property is an array containing display information for
the claim. The array MUST contain an object for each locale that is
supported by the type. The consuming application MUST use the
language tag it considers most appropriate for the user.
The objects in the array have the following properties:
* locale: A language tag as defined in Section 2 of [RFC5646]. This
property is REQUIRED.
* label: A human-readable label for the claim, intended for end
users. This property is REQUIRED.
* description: A human-readable description for the claim, intended
for end users. This property is OPTIONAL.
See Figure 30 in Appendix A.2 for an example that includes claim
display metadata.
5.6.3. Claim Mandatory Metadata
The mandatory property is a boolean indicating that, if set to true,
the claim MUST be included in the credential by the Issuer. If the
value is false or omitted, the claim is considered optional for the
Issuer to include. A claim that is mandatory can nonetheless be
selectively disclosable, as described in Section 5.6.4.
5.6.4. Claim Selective Disclosure Metadata
The sd property is a string indicating whether the claim is
selectively disclosable. The following values are defined:
* always: The Issuer MUST make the claim selectively disclosable.
* allowed: The Issuer MAY make the claim selectively disclosable.
* never: The Issuer MUST NOT make the claim selectively disclosable.
If omitted, the default value is allowed. It is RECOMMENDED to use
either always or never to avoid ambiguity.
See Figure 30 in Appendix A.2 for an example that includes claim
selective disclosure metadata.
5.6.5. Extending Claim Metadata
When an SD-JWT VC type extends another type as described in
Section 5.4, all claim metadata from the extended type MUST be
respected and are inherited by the child type unless it is overridden
by the child type as defined in the following.
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If the child type defines claim metadata with the same path as in the
extended type, the child type's properties are combined with those of
the extended type, with the child type's properties taking
precedence. Limitations to this rule are defined for sd and
mandatory in Section 5.6.5.1.
The contents of properties are never merged (e.g., if the base
display property contains two locale objects and the extending type
contains one, the resulting display property will contain only the
one object defined for the child type).
Note: The rule for overriding claim metadata is different from the
one for display metadata described in Section 5.5.2. This ensures
that Consumers can rely on the claim metadata defined in the extended
type while still allowing display customization for the visual
representation of the credential.
5.6.5.1. Limitations for sd and mandatory
An extending type can specify an sd property for a claim that is
marked as allowed in the extended type (or where sd was omitted),
changing it to either always or never. However, it MUST NOT change a
claim that is marked as always or never in the extended type to a
different value.
Similarly, an extending type can set the mandatory property of a
claim that is optional in the extended type to true, but it MUST NOT
change a claim that is mandatory in the extended type to false.
5.6.5.2. Example for Extending Type Metadata
The base type metadata document for this example is shown in
Figure 20.
{
"vct": "https://example.com/base-type-metadata",
"claims": [
{
"path": ["name"],
"display": [{"label": "Full Name", "locale": "en"}]
},
{
"path": ["address", "city"],
"display": [{"label": "City", "locale": "en"}]
}
]
}
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Figure 20: Example Base Type Metadata Document
The extending type metadata document is shown in Figure 21.
{
"vct": "https://example.com/custom-type-metadata",
"extends": "https://example.com/base-type-metadata",
"claims": [
{
"path": ["address", "city"],
"display": [{"label": "Town", "locale": "en"}]
},
{
"path": ["nationalities"],
"display": [{"label": "Nationalities", "locale": "en"}]
}
]
}
Figure 21: Example Child Type Metadata Document
In this example, the child type inherits the name claim metadata from
the base type, but overrides the address.city claim metadata with its
own definition. It also adds a new claim metadata for nationalities.
The final effective claim metadata for the child type is shown here
in Figure 22:
{
"claims": [
{
"path": ["name"],
"display": [{"label": "Full Name", "locale": "en"}]
},
{
"path": ["address", "city"],
"display": [{"label": "Town", "locale": "en"}]
},
{
"path": ["nationalities"],
"display": [{"label": "Nationalities", "locale": "en"}]
}
]
}
Figure 22: Effective Claim Metadata for Child Type
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5.7. Processing Type Metadata
This specification does not require every Holder or Verifier to
process Type Metadata; whether Type Metadata is processed is
determined by the Holder's or Verifier's policy and, where
applicable, ecosystem rules. A Holder or Verifier typically
processes Type Metadata after the processed SD-JWT payload is
available, as described in Section 2.4.
If Type Metadata is processed, it MUST be fully processed, including
any extended types (see Section 5.4), before its contents are used
for validation, display, rendering, or acceptance decisions. If the
Type Metadata after applying any extensions contains claim metadata,
the Holder or Verifier MUST process and validate the claim metadata
as defined in Section 5.6. If claim metadata processing or
validation fails, the SD-JWT VC MUST be rejected.
If Type Metadata processing is required by policy or ecosystem rules
and the Holder or Verifier cannot retrieve or process the applicable
Type Metadata, the SD-JWT VC MUST be rejected.
6. Integrity of Referenced Documents
This section defines how integrity can be asserted for documents
referenced by an SD-JWT VC and its Type Metadata. For references
such as vct, extends, and uri, a corresponding #integrity value can
be used to identify the expected content of the retrieved document.
If such an integrity value is present, the Consumer verifies that the
retrieved document matches it before processing that document.
The vct claim in the SD-JWT VC as defined in Section 2.2.2.3 and
various URIs in the Type Metadata MAY be accompanied by a respective
item suffixed with #integrity, in particular:
* extends as defined in Section 5.4, and
* uri as used in three places in Section 5.5.1.
The value MUST be an "integrity metadata" string as defined in
Section 3 of [W3C.SRI]. This specification uses [W3C.SRI] only for
the syntax of that string and the identification of the hash
algorithms; the verification procedure is defined in the following.
If an integrity property is present for a claim or metadata property,
the Consumer of the referenced document MUST verify the integrity of
the retrieved document as follows: The Consumer computes the digest
of the octets of the retrieved document using the hash algorithm
identified in the integrity metadata and compares the result, after
base64 decoding, octet-for-octet with the digest value carried in the
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integrity metadata. If the integrity metadata contains multiple hash
expressions, the Consumer MUST use the hash expressions with the
strongest hash algorithm it supports; verification succeeds if the
computed digest matches the digest value of any of those hash
expressions. If verification fails, or if the Consumer supports none
of the hash algorithms used in the integrity metadata, the retrieved
document MUST be rejected and MUST NOT be processed further.
Note that the verification procedure above is defined independently
of the response verification algorithm in [W3C.SRI]. That algorithm
is specified in terms of browser Fetch responses and makes integrity
validation contingent on the response being same-origin or CORS-
eligible, which does not apply to the retrieval mechanisms defined in
this specification. Consequently, servers are not required to
support CORS for the referenced documents, and Consumers MUST NOT
make the verification result dependent on CORS response header
fields.
7. Security Considerations
The security considerations in the SD-JWT specification [RFC9901]
apply to this specification. Additionally, the following security
considerations need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs:
7.1. Server-Side Request Forgery
The URLs dereferenced according to this specification, e.g., for the
JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration, the JWK Set referenced by
jwks_uri, Type Metadata, and rendering resources, are derived from
untrusted input such as the iss and vct claim values of a received
SD-JWT VC. Similar to other metadata endpoints, these URLs MUST be
considered untrusted values and could be a vector for Server-Side
Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks.
Before making a request to any of these URLs, including every
redirect target as described in Section 3, the Consumer MUST validate
the URL to ensure that it is a valid HTTPS URL and that it does not
point to internal resources. Internal resources include, in
particular, hosts with addresses from the IANA Special-Purpose
Address Registries [RFC6890] that are not globally reachable (such as
loopback, link-local, and private-use address ranges) as well as
hosts that are only reachable from within the Consumer's network.
Validation requires ensuring that the host part of the URL does not
address an internal service (by IP address or an internal host name)
and that, if an external DNS name is used, the resolved DNS name does
not point to an internal IP address.
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The requirements in Section 3 to perform each retrieval in a time-
bound and size-bound manner and to validate the response content
before processing it also serve to limit the impact of SSRF and
denial-of-service attacks.
Additional considerations can be found in [OWASP_SSRF].
7.2. Serving Documents and Rendering Resources
The documents and resources defined in this specification are served
over HTTPS and therefore also remain reachable by web browsers and
other clients that do not implement this specification. To limit the
risk of these documents and resources being misinterpreted or used as
active content in such contexts (see Section 4.13 of [RFC9205]),
Issuers and Publishers SHOULD include an X-Content-Type-Options:
nosniff response header field to prevent clients from interpreting a
response as a different media type than declared, and SHOULD include
a restrictive Content-Security-Policy response header field (e.g.,
default-src 'none') so that content such as SVG templates is not
granted access to active content capabilities when opened directly in
a browser.
7.3. Ecosystem-specific Public Key Verification Methods
When defining ecosystem-specific rules for resolution and
verification of the public key, as outlined in Section 2.5, it is
critical that those rules maintain the integrity of the relationship
between the iss value of the SD-JWT, if present, and the public keys
of the Issuer.
A Verifier MUST ensure that for any given iss value, an attacker
cannot influence the type of verification process used. Otherwise,
an attacker could attempt to make the Verifier use a verification
process not intended by the Issuer, allowing the attacker to
potentially manipulate the verification result to their advantage.
7.4. Circular "extends" Dependencies of Types
A type MUST NOT extend another type that extends (either directly or
with steps in-between) the first type. This would result in a
circular dependency that could lead to infinite recursion when
retrieving and processing the metadata.
Consumers MUST detect such circular dependencies and reject the
credential.
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7.5. Robust Retrieval of Type Metadata
In Section 5.3, various methods for distributing and retrieving
metadata are described. Methods relying on a network connection may
fail due to network issues or unavailability of a network connection
due to offline usage of credentials, temporary server outages, or
denial-of-service attacks on the metadata server.
Consumers SHOULD therefore implement a local cache as described in
Section 5.3.4 if possible. Such a cache MAY be populated with
metadata before the credential is used.
These measures allow the Consumers to continue to function even if
the metadata server is temporarily unavailable and avoid privacy
issues as described in Section 8.4.
7.6. Risks Associated with Textual Information
Some claims in the SD-JWT VC and properties in the Type Metadata,
e.g., display, allow issuers and providers of metadata to specify
human-readable information. These can contain arbitrary textual
information that may be displayed to end users and developers. As
such, any consuming application MUST ensure that maliciously crafted
information cannot be used to compromise the security of the
application or the privacy of the user. To this end, the following
considerations apply:
* The consuming application MUST ensure that the text is properly
escaped before displaying it to the user or transferring it into
other contexts. For example, if the data is displayed in an HTML
document, the text MUST be properly escaped to prevent Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS) attacks.
* The consuming application MUST ensure that the display of the user
interface elements cannot be distorted by overly long text or
special characters.
7.7. Credential Type Extension and Issuer Authorization
When processing credentials, it is important to recognize that the
ability to extend or reference an existing credential type (e.g., a
well-known identifier such as urn:ec.eu.x.y.z) does not confer any
implicit authorization to issue credentials of that type or its
extensions. In particular:
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* *Issuer Authorization*: Verifiers and Holders MUST NOT assume that
any issuer who issues a credential extending a known type is
authorized to do so. The mere presence of an extension or
reference to a recognized type (e.g., a national type urn:de.bla
extending a European PID type) does not validate the issuer's
authority.
* *Rogue Issuers*: Attackers may issue credentials with types that
extend or mimic legitimate types (e.g., urn:attacker extending
urn:ec.eu.x.y.z). Such credentials MUST NOT be accepted solely
based on their type hierarchy or extension relationship.
* *Processing Rules*: Implementations MUST verify the issuer's
authorization independently of the credential type or its
extensions. This typically involves checking the issuer's
identity, trust status, and any relevant accreditation or registry
before accepting a credential.
Verifiers and Holders MUST implement explicit checks for issuer
authorization and MUST NOT rely on type extension as a proxy for
trust or legitimacy. Credential acceptance decisions MUST be based
on both the credential type and the verified authority of the issuer.
The same considerations apply to the additional types asserted via
the aka_vcts claim defined in Section 2.2.2.2. These types are
asserted by the Issuer and, for types without Type Metadata, cannot
be corroborated by an extends relationship. Verifiers and Holders
therefore MUST NOT treat the presence of a type in the aka_vcts claim
as evidence that the Issuer is authorized to issue credentials of, or
derived from, that type.
7.8. Trust in Type Metadata
Type Metadata associated with an SD-JWT VC, e.g., rendering metadata,
is asserted by the Publisher of the Type Metadata and trust in this
metadata depends on the trust relationship between its Publisher and
the Consumer. A Consumer MUST NOT assume that Type Metadata is
accurate or meaningful unless the Publisher is recognized as
authoritative for the type in question.
Ecosystems SHOULD define governance or accreditation mechanisms that
specify which Publishers are authorized to provide Type Metadata for
specific verifiable digital credential types and under what
conditions such metadata can be relied upon.
Consumers SHOULD treat with reduced trust any Type Metadata if the
Publisher is not accredited or otherwise trusted within the
applicable ecosystem.
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7.9. Use of Data URIs for Claim Types
The use of data URIs allows embedding of data directly within
credential payloads. Implementations SHOULD treat data URIs as
untrusted input at the processing and rendering layer and apply
appropriate validation and handling. Failure to properly escape,
sanitize or constrain their use can lead to security issues such as
unintended code execution, resource exhaustion, or misuse of embedded
content. Implementations SHOULD restrict the set of accepted media
types, enforce reasonable size and content limits, and avoid
dereferencing or interpreting data URIs in ways that could execute or
render active content, consistent with their overall security model.
7.10. SVG Rendering
When rendering an SVG template as described in Section 5.5.1.2.2, a
consuming application MUST ensure that malicious metadata providers
or issuers cannot inject executable code into the SVG template and
thereby compromise the security of the consuming application. The
consuming application MUST NOT execute any code in the SVG template.
If code execution cannot be prevented reliably, the SVG display MUST
be sandboxed.
Furthermore, consuming applications MUST ensure that references to
external resources (images, etc.) from within the SVG cannot be used
to track users or the usage of credentials.
8. Privacy Considerations
The privacy considerations in the SD-JWT specification [RFC9901]
apply to this specification. Additionally, the following privacy
considerations need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs.
8.1. Unlinkability
The privacy considerations in Section 10.1 of [RFC9901] apply,
especially to the cnf claim.
8.2. Verifiable Digital Credential Type Identifier
Issuers and Holders have to be aware that while this specification
supports selective disclosure of claims of a given SD-JWT VC, the vct
claim is not selectively disclosable. In certain situations this
could lead to unwanted leakage of additional context information.
In general, Issuers are advised to choose vct values following data
minimization principles. For example, government Issuers issuing an
SD-JWT VC to their citizens to enable them to prove their age, might
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consider using a vct value that does not allow third-parties to infer
additional personal information about the Holder, e.g., country of
residency or citizenship.
Additionally, Holders have to be informed that, besides the actual
requested claims, the vct information is shared with the Verifier.
The same considerations apply to the aka_vcts claim, which is also
not selectively disclosable and reveals the additional types of the
credential.
8.3. Issuer Phone-Home
A malicious Issuer can choose the Issuer identifier of the SD-JWT VC
to enable tracking the usage behavior of the Holder if the Issuer
identifier is Holder-specific and if the resolution of the key
material to verify the Issuer-signed JWT requires the Verifier to
phone home to the Issuer.
For example, a malicious Issuer could generate a unique value for the
Issuer identifier per Holder, e.g., https://example.com/issuer/
holder-1234 and host the JWT VC Issuer Metadata. The Verifier would
create an HTTP GET request to the Holder-specific well-known URI when
the SD-JWT VC is verified. This would allow the malicious Issuer to
keep track where and how often the SD-JWT VC was used.
Verifiers are advised to establish trust in an SD-JWT VC by pinning
specific Issuer identifiers and should monitor suspicious behavior
such as frequent rotation of those identifiers. If such behavior is
detected, Verifiers are advised to reject SD-JWT VCs issued by those
Issuers and not to retrieve associated metadata. Holders are
similarly advised to exercise caution with SD-JWT VCs if they contain
unexpected or easily correlatable information in the Issuer
identifier.
Another related concern arises from the use of confirmation methods
in the cnf claim that involve retrieving key material from a remote
source, especially if that source is controlled by the issuer. This
includes, but is not limited to, the use of the x5u parameter in JWKs
(Section 4.6 of [RFC7517]), the jku parameter (Section 3.5 of
[RFC7800]), and cases where a URL is used in the kid parameter
(Section 3.4 of [RFC7800]). Future confirmation methods may also
introduce remote retrieval mechanisms. Issuers are advised not to
issue SD-JWT VCs with such cnf methods, and Verifiers and Holders are
advised not to follow or resolve remote references for key material
in the cnf claim. Only confirmation methods that do not require
remote retrieval of key material SHOULD be supported.
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8.4. Privacy-Preserving Retrieval of Type Metadata
In Section 5.3, various methods for distributing and retrieving Type
Metadata are described. For methods which rely on a network
connection to a URL (e.g., provided by an Issuer), the Issuer and
other third parties may be able to track the usage of a credential by
observing requests to the Type Metadata URL. The same applies to the
retrieval of rendering resources such as logos, background images,
and SVG templates referenced from Type Metadata as described in
Section 5.5.1.
Consumers SHOULD prefer methods for retrieving Type Metadata and the
resources it references that do not leak information about the usage
of a credential to third parties. The recommendations in Section 7.5
apply.
9. IANA Considerations
9.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification requests registration of the following Claims in
the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT] established by
[RFC7519].
* Claim Name: "vct"
* Claim Description: Verifiable digital Credential Type identifier
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ Section 2.2.2.1 of this
specification ]]
* Claim Name: "vct#integrity"
* Claim Description: SD-JWT VC vct claim "integrity metadata" value
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ Section 6 of this specification ]]
* Claim Name: "aka_vcts"
* Claim Description: Additional types of the verifiable digital
credential
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ Section 2.2.2.2 of this
specification ]]
9.2. Media Types Registry
9.2.1. application/dc+sd-jwt
This section requests registration of the application/dc+sd-jwt media
type in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes].
* Type name: application
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* Subtype name: dc+sd-jwt
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: 8-bit code points; SD-JWT VC values are
encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may
be the empty string) separated by period ('.') and tilde ('~')
characters.
* Security considerations: See Security Considerations in Section 7.
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Published specification: [[ this specification ]]
* Applications that use this media type: Applications that issue,
present, and verify SD-JWT-based Verifiable Digital Credentials.
* Additional information:
- Magic number(s): n/a
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information: Oliver
Terbu oliver.terbu@mattr.global (mailto:oliver.terbu@mattr.global)
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: Oliver Terbu oliver.terbu@mattr.global
(mailto:oliver.terbu@mattr.global)
* Change controller: IETF
9.3. Well-Known URI Registry
This specification requests the well-known URI defined in Section 4
in the IANA "Well-Known URIs" registry [IANA.well-known] as described
in by [RFC8615].
9.3.1. Registry Contents
* URI suffix: jwt-vc-issuer
* Change controller: IETF
* Specification document: [[ Section 4 of this specification ]]
* Related information: (none)
* Status: permanent
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
.
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[RFC2397] Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme", RFC 2397,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2397, August 1998,
.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
.
[RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,
September 2009, .
[RFC6890] Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., Ed., and B. Haberman,
"Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153,
RFC 6890, DOI 10.17487/RFC6890, April 2013,
.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, .
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
.
[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, .
[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
.
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[RFC9111] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022,
.
[RFC9901] Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective
Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens", RFC 9901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9901, November 2025,
.
[W3C.CSS-COLOR]
Çelik, T., Lilley, C., and L. D. Baron, "CSS Color Module
Level 3", 18 January 2022,
.
[W3C.SRI] Akhawe, D., Braun, F., Marier, F., and J. Weinberger,
"Subresource Integrity", 23 June 2016,
.
10.2. Informative References
[EUDIW.ARF]
Commission, E., "The European Digital Identity Wallet
Architecture and Reference Framework",
.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list]
Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status
List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
oauth-status-list-21, 21 June 2026,
.
[IANA.JWT] IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
.
[IANA.MediaTypes]
IANA, "Media Types", .
[IANA.well-known]
IANA, "Well-Known URIs",
.
[NIST-BLOG.VDCE]
Fisher, B. and R. Galluzzo, "Digital Identities: Getting
to Know the Verifiable Digital Credential Ecosystem", 13
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November 2024, .
[OWASP_SSRF]
OWASP, "Server Side Request Forgery Prevention Cheat
Sheet", .
[RFC6901] Bryan, P., Ed., Zyp, K., and M. Nottingham, Ed.,
"JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Pointer", RFC 6901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6901, April 2013,
.
[RFC9205] Nottingham, M., "Building Protocols with HTTP", BCP 56,
RFC 9205, DOI 10.17487/RFC9205, June 2022,
.
[RFC9535] Gössner, S., Ed., Normington, G., Ed., and C. Bormann,
Ed., "JSONPath: Query Expressions for JSON", RFC 9535,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9535, February 2024,
.
Appendix A. Examples
Important: The following examples are not normative and provided for
illustrative purposes only. In particular, neither the structure of
the claims nor the selection of selectively disclosable claims are
normative.
Line breaks have been added for readability.
A.1. Example Person Identification Data (PID) Credential
This example shows how the artifacts defined in this specification
could be used to represent the identity information of a person from
a fictional European country. It leans on the concept of Person
Identification Data (PID) as defined in the "PID Rulebook" in
[EUDIW.ARF], but does not intend to fully comply with that
specification.
Key Binding is applied using the Holder's public key passed in a cnf
claim in the SD-JWT.
The information in Figure 23 about the citizen comprises the input
data used by the Issuer:
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{
"iss": "https://pid-issuer.aendgard.example",
"vct": "urn:example:eudi:pid:aendgard:1",
"given_name": "Astrid",
"family_name": "Holmgren",
"birthdate": "1978-04-10",
"address": {
"street_address": "Sjøgata 12",
"locality": "Viken",
"postal_code": "12001",
"country": "Kingdom of Ændgard"
},
"nationalities": [
"Ændgard"
],
"sex": 2,
"birth_family_name": "Jensen",
"place_of_birth": {
"locality": "Ændholm",
"country": "Kingdom of Ændgard"
},
"age_equal_or_over": {
"12": true,
"14": true,
"16": true,
"18": true,
"21": true,
"65": false
},
"age_in_years": 47,
"age_birth_year": 1978,
"portrait": "
WAQMAAACSfKx9AAAAAXNSR0IB2cksfwAAAARnQU1BAACxjwv8YQUAAAAgY0hSTQA
AeiYAAICEAAD6AAAAgOgAAHUwAADqYAAAOpgAABdwnLpRPAAAAAZQTFRFAAAA///
/pdmf3QAAAFFJREFUCNdNylENgDAQA9ASBJyEWcDBLE0CTpDCpCDhPvexrBwlC/y
8NG3RMunw9Ai5p6/pr/ZzlcAi4WiRN1nlXAesOgheBTSO8JDnND6Z3W+d90fCnTj
jKQAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==",
"issuance_date": "2024-01-15",
"expiry_date": "2034-01-15",
"issuing_authority": "Kingdom of Ændgard, Ministry of Interior",
"issuing_country": "ÆG"
}
Figure 23: Citizen's Information
The following in Figure 24 is the issued SD-JWT:
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eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjJyMDA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.0bJ9ZMO36qi-SuLQaZZSGJMyA9yO5Z2s
V_lxJyspURbkfmC4P9SlmNizVHyifDPtF9TgfJjKMmvOxMsKSLAdJA~WyIyR0xDNDJzS
1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiQXN0cmlkIl0~WyJlbHVWNU9nM
2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkhvbG1ncmVuIl0~WyI2SWo3d
E0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTc4LTA0LTEwIl0~WyJlS
ThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwgIlNqXHUwMGY4Z
2F0YSAxMiJd~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlZp
a2VuIl0~WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIiwgIjEy
MDAxIl0~WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2luZ2Rv
bSBvZiBcdTAwYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImFkZ
HJlc3MiLCB7Il9zZCI6IFsiNjBCM0N3cTA0aGxQQndzdnNmdks5SlV4dnVMRlViSlFmZ
1BCYk9fSDlyTSIsICI4eWpQUjNyOGRPNUhXTG55MWdCZU1KVFBSZ2tCY2h1cTQzcUg4V
2xfZjFjIiwgIk5hcmQ3NHcyTl85YW5WRW1TbGVjRUpscXgzanhiY3F4dlZ6QnNCRFgwe
HMiLCAiVS16RDFESS03WjB6WW94WHF5NUhTVE5VZWdhaFJDSHlkQWVzS09fc0VQYyJdf
V0~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBbIlx1M
DBjNm5kZ2FyZCJdXQ~WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgInNleCIsIDJd~W
yI1YlBzMUlxdVpOYTBoa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImJpcnRoX2ZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkplb
nNlbiJd~WyI1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1rXzdQcS13IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlx1MDBj
Nm5kaG9sbSJd~WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2l
uZ2RvbSBvZiBcdTAwYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ~WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwg
InBsYWNlX29mX2JpcnRoIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIkpET1lLUzB3MENvZm8tSGpaR3ZyZDdI
aXJwU2ZpWURBTFU2cjhUX0xFMWciLCAib1RacjlFbXk5eG1ycGNmUTVaU1U4c3Z4ZE1Z
OHk0WElGXzVqOVAxdTF5QSJdfV0~WyJDOUdTb3VqdmlKcXVFZ1lmb2pDYjFBIiwgIjEy
IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJreDVrRjE3Vi14MEptd1V4OXZndnR3IiwgIjE0IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJI
M28xdXN3UDc2MEZpMnllR2RWQ0VRIiwgIjE2IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJPQktsVFZsdkxnLUFk
d3FZR2JQOFpBIiwgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJNMEpiNTd0NDF1YnJrU3V5ckRUM3hBIiwg
IjIxIiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJEc210S05ncFY0ZEFIcGpyY2Fvc0F3IiwgIjY1IiwgZmFsc2Vd
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~WyJlSzVvNXBIZmd1cFBwbHRqMXFoQUp3IiwgImFnZV9lcXVhbF9vcl9vdmVyIiwgeyJ
fc2QiOiBbIjF0RWl5elBSWU9Lc2Y3U3NZR01nUFpLc09UMWxRWlJ4SFhBMHI1X0J3a2s
iLCAiQ1ZLbmx5NVA5MHlKczNFd3R4UWlPdFVjemFYQ1lOQTRJY3pSYW9ock1EZyIsICJ
hNDQtZzJHcjhfM0FtSncyWFo4a0kxeTBRel96ZTlpT2NXMlczUkxwWEdnIiwgImdrdnk
wRnV2QkJ2ajBoczJaTnd4Y3FPbGY4bXUyLWtDRTctTmIyUXh1QlUiLCAiaHJZNEhubUY
1YjVKd0M5ZVR6YUZDVWNlSVFBYUlkaHJxVVhRTkNXYmZaSSIsICJ5NlNGclZGUnlxNTB
JYlJKdmlUWnFxalFXejB0TGl1Q21NZU8wS3FhekdJIl19XQ~WyJqN0FEZGIwVVZiMExp
MGNpUGNQMGV3IiwgImFnZV9pbl95ZWFycyIsIDQ3XQ~WyJXcHhKckZ1WDh1U2kycDRod
DA5anZ3IiwgImFnZV9iaXJ0aF95ZWFyIiwgMTk3OF0~WyJhdFNtRkFDWU1iSlZLRDA1b
zNKZ3RRIiwgInBvcnRyYWl0IiwgImRhdGE6aW1hZ2UvcG5nO2Jhc2U2NCxpVkJPUncwS
0dnb0FBQUFOU1VoRVVnQUFBQ1FBQUFBV0FRTUFBQUNTZkt4OUFBQUFBWE5TUjBJQjJja
3Nmd0FBQUFSblFVMUJBQUN4and2OFlRVUFBQUFnWTBoU1RRQUFlaVlBQUlDRUFBRDZBQ
UFBZ09nQUFIVXdBQURxWUFBQU9wZ0FBQmR3bkxwUlBBQUFBQVpRVEZSRkFBQUEvLy8vc
GRtZjNRQUFBRkZKUkVGVUNOZE55bEVOZ0RBUUE5QVNCSnlFV2NEQkxFMENUcERDcENEa
FB2ZXhyQndsQy95OE5HM1JNdW53OUFpNXA2L3ByL1p6bGNBaTRXaVJOMW5sWEFlc09na
GVCVFNPOEpEbk5ENlozVytkOTBmQ25UampLUUFBQUFCSlJVNUVya0pnZ2c9PSJd~WyI0
S3lSMzJvSVp0LXprV3ZGcWJVTEtnIiwgImlzc3VhbmNlX2RhdGUiLCAiMjAyNC0wMS0x
NSJd~WyJjaEJDc3loeWgtSjg2SS1hd1FEaUNRIiwgImV4cGlyeV9kYXRlIiwgIjIwMzQ
tMDEtMTUiXQ~WyJmbE5QMW5jTXo5TGctYzlxTUl6XzlnIiwgImlzc3VpbmdfYXV0aG9y
aXR5IiwgIktpbmdkb20gb2YgXHUwMGM2bmRnYXJkLCBNaW5pc3RyeSBvZiBJbnRlcmlv
ciJd~WyJvdm9WMXJraF9BTm04NjFxVUFBMkF3IiwgImlzc3VpbmdfY291bnRyeSIsICJ
cdTAwYzZHIl0~
Figure 24: Issued SD-JWT
Figure 25 is the payload of that SD-JWT:
Terbu, et al. Expires 4 March 2027 [Page 53]
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{
"_sd": [
"2r009dzvHuVrWrRXT5kJMmHnqEHHnWe0MLVZw8PATB8",
"3NdDJYRwBqaEIyXCHcn4a5YKJagPgIP0Wkg9AorgAKg",
"5fn6IiXjUPmGQ4mYHxDdt6EjvBQ7gRvGcdEnSCEN8Ek",
"6BzMBk7FGivogbldO75f3NLwjFliCqb7nn1GhgCokrQ",
"90CT8AaBPbn5X8nRXkesju1i0BqhWqZ3wqD4jF-qDGk",
"9nEwUrdeZ6kcRbEj52QH3nOR-oie0_p9tMNIAEuFvMU",
"HTh6Zr2J8aiqpa963cLkuKeQDf9O00FzOHhyjGpVfTg",
"JCp2K2NhH-LE5L0j7ME0LNx-T-px9QFtamSsxmCUCxU",
"LoMGrhlDm_bUWUX1gdhRxTsy4d4zywGzlSVocRSY01M",
"UgUjq5whzQewO59fVNj0f0mqyV8YPXU54sp4kLecwQk",
"Y0H-E3hzKEUnAyri_x9tT9k-j4i65ao9hkeEHNexosI",
"ezCAmaTwI2nPj_1IiB3KZfiEORLeRwhZsMMDMZIJ8kA",
"i0H_-WAHwfEjt8tqQH74uOCWvquY3FwuX-kx4e2RJH8",
"r1GrH46yDV62sezImEjxa6cJSZMT212jrOSHiec9ytM",
"rVj3RLs7K8zdNy7zXz1Cr39Y6rog8ulNozk4F7NCuC0",
"t5kp0HfxMS1eHNCGRzrK9Gi5oTZreg5Ue9lLQIuLvB4"
],
"iss": "https://pid-issuer.aendgard.example",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "urn:example:eudi:pid:aendgard:1",
"_sd_alg": "sha-256",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
}
}
Figure 25: SD-JWT Payload
The digests in the SD-JWT payload reference the following
Disclosures:
*Claim given_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 3NdDJYRwBqaEIyXCHcn4a5YKJagPgIP0Wkg9AorgAKg
* Disclosure:
WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiQXN0
cmlkIl0
* Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "given_name", "Astrid"]
*Claim family_name*:
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* SHA-256 Hash: JCp2K2NhH-LE5L0j7ME0LNx-T-px9QFtamSsxmCUCxU
* Disclosure:
WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkhv
bG1ncmVuIl0
* Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "family_name", "Holmgren"]
*Claim birthdate*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 5fn6IiXjUPmGQ4mYHxDdt6EjvBQ7gRvGcdEnSCEN8Ek
* Disclosure:
WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTc4
LTA0LTEwIl0
* Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "birthdate", "1978-04-10"]
*Claim street_address*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 8yjPR3r8dO5HWLny1gBeMJTPRgkBchuq43qH8Wl_f1c
* Disclosure:
WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwg
IlNqXHUwMGY4Z2F0YSAxMiJd
* Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "street_address",
"Sj\u00f8gata
12"]
*Claim locality*:
* SHA-256 Hash: Nard74w2N_9anVEmSlecEJlqx3jxbcqxvVzBsBDX0xs
* Disclosure:
WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlZpa2Vu
Il0
* Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "locality", "Viken"]
*Claim postal_code*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 60B3Cwq04hlPBwsvsfvK9JUxvuLFUbJQfgPBbO_H9rM
* Disclosure:
WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIiwgIjEy
MDAxIl0
* Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "postal_code", "12001"]
*Claim country*:
* SHA-256 Hash: U-zD1DI-7Z0zYoxXqy5HSTNUegahRCHydAesKO_sEPc
* Disclosure:
WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2luZ2Rv
bSBvZiBcdTAwYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ
* Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "country", "Kingdom of
\u00c6ndgard"]
Terbu, et al. Expires 4 March 2027 [Page 55]
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*Claim address*:
* SHA-256 Hash: i0H_-WAHwfEjt8tqQH74uOCWvquY3FwuX-kx4e2RJH8
* Disclosure:
WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7Il9zZCI6
IFsiNjBCM0N3cTA0aGxQQndzdnNmdks5SlV4dnVMRlViSlFmZ1BCYk9fSDly
TSIsICI4eWpQUjNyOGRPNUhXTG55MWdCZU1KVFBSZ2tCY2h1cTQzcUg4V2xf
ZjFjIiwgIk5hcmQ3NHcyTl85YW5WRW1TbGVjRUpscXgzanhiY3F4dlZ6QnNC
RFgweHMiLCAiVS16RDFESS03WjB6WW94WHF5NUhTVE5VZWdhaFJDSHlkQWVz
S09fc0VQYyJdfV0
* Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "address", {"_sd":
["60B3Cwq04hlPBwsvsfvK9JUxvuLFUbJQfgPBbO_H9rM",
"8yjPR3r8dO5HWLny1gBeMJTPRgkBchuq43qH8Wl_f1c",
"Nard74w2N_9anVEmSlecEJlqx3jxbcqxvVzBsBDX0xs",
"U-zD1DI-7Z0zYoxXqy5HSTNUegahRCHydAesKO_sEPc"]}]
*Claim nationalities*:
* SHA-256 Hash: HTh6Zr2J8aiqpa963cLkuKeQDf9O00FzOHhyjGpVfTg
* Disclosure:
WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBb
Ilx1MDBjNm5kZ2FyZCJdXQ
* Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "nationalities",
["\u00c6ndgard"]]
*Claim sex*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 90CT8AaBPbn5X8nRXkesju1i0BqhWqZ3wqD4jF-qDGk
* Disclosure:
WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgInNleCIsIDJd
* Contents: ["nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA", "sex", 2]
*Claim birth_family_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: t5kp0HfxMS1eHNCGRzrK9Gi5oTZreg5Ue9lLQIuLvB4
* Disclosure:
WyI1YlBzMUlxdVpOYTBoa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImJpcnRoX2ZhbWlseV9uYW1l
IiwgIkplbnNlbiJd
* Contents: ["5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw", "birth_family_name",
"Jensen"]
*Claim locality*:
* SHA-256 Hash: JDOYKS0w0Cofo-HjZGvrd7HirpSfiYDALU6r8T_LE1g
* Disclosure:
WyI1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1rXzdQcS13IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlx1MDBj
Nm5kaG9sbSJd
* Contents: ["5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w", "locality", "\u00c6ndholm"]
Terbu, et al. Expires 4 March 2027 [Page 56]
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*Claim country*:
* SHA-256 Hash: oTZr9Emy9xmrpcfQ5ZSU8svxdMY8y4XIF_5j9P1u1yA
* Disclosure:
WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2luZ2Rv
bSBvZiBcdTAwYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ
* Contents: ["y1sVU5wdfJahVdgwPgS7RQ", "country", "Kingdom of
\u00c6ndgard"]
*Claim place_of_birth*:
* SHA-256 Hash: r1GrH46yDV62sezImEjxa6cJSZMT212jrOSHiec9ytM
* Disclosure:
WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgInBsYWNlX29mX2JpcnRoIiwg
eyJfc2QiOiBbIkpET1lLUzB3MENvZm8tSGpaR3ZyZDdIaXJwU2ZpWURBTFU2
cjhUX0xFMWciLCAib1RacjlFbXk5eG1ycGNmUTVaU1U4c3Z4ZE1ZOHk0WElG
XzVqOVAxdTF5QSJdfV0
* Contents: ["HbQ4X8srVW3QDxnIJdqyOA", "place_of_birth", {"_sd":
["JDOYKS0w0Cofo-HjZGvrd7HirpSfiYDALU6r8T_LE1g",
"oTZr9Emy9xmrpcfQ5ZSU8svxdMY8y4XIF_5j9P1u1yA"]}]
*Claim 12*:
* SHA-256 Hash: gkvy0FuvBBvj0hs2ZNwxcqOlf8mu2-kCE7-Nb2QxuBU
* Disclosure:
WyJDOUdTb3VqdmlKcXVFZ1lmb2pDYjFBIiwgIjEyIiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["C9GSoujviJquEgYfojCb1A", "12", true]
*Claim 14*:
* SHA-256 Hash: y6SFrVFRyq50IbRJviTZqqjQWz0tLiuCmMeO0KqazGI
* Disclosure:
WyJreDVrRjE3Vi14MEptd1V4OXZndnR3IiwgIjE0IiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["kx5kF17V-x0JmwUx9vgvtw", "14", true]
*Claim 16*:
* SHA-256 Hash: hrY4HnmF5b5JwC9eTzaFCUceIQAaIdhrqUXQNCWbfZI
* Disclosure:
WyJIM28xdXN3UDc2MEZpMnllR2RWQ0VRIiwgIjE2IiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["H3o1uswP760Fi2yeGdVCEQ", "16", true]
*Claim 18*:
* SHA-256 Hash: CVKnly5P90yJs3EwtxQiOtUczaXCYNA4IczRaohrMDg
* Disclosure:
WyJPQktsVFZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFpBIiwgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["OBKlTVlvLg-AdwqYGbP8ZA", "18", true]
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*Claim 21*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 1tEiyzPRYOKsf7SsYGMgPZKsOT1lQZRxHXA0r5_Bwkk
* Disclosure:
WyJNMEpiNTd0NDF1YnJrU3V5ckRUM3hBIiwgIjIxIiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["M0Jb57t41ubrkSuyrDT3xA", "21", true]
*Claim 65*:
* SHA-256 Hash: a44-g2Gr8_3AmJw2XZ8kI1y0Qz_ze9iOcW2W3RLpXGg
* Disclosure:
WyJEc210S05ncFY0ZEFIcGpyY2Fvc0F3IiwgIjY1IiwgZmFsc2Vd
* Contents: ["DsmtKNgpV4dAHpjrcaosAw", "65", false]
*Claim age_equal_or_over*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 2r009dzvHuVrWrRXT5kJMmHnqEHHnWe0MLVZw8PATB8
* Disclosure:
WyJlSzVvNXBIZmd1cFBwbHRqMXFoQUp3IiwgImFnZV9lcXVhbF9vcl9vdmVy
IiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIjF0RWl5elBSWU9Lc2Y3U3NZR01nUFpLc09UMWxRWlJ4
SFhBMHI1X0J3a2siLCAiQ1ZLbmx5NVA5MHlKczNFd3R4UWlPdFVjemFYQ1lO
QTRJY3pSYW9ock1EZyIsICJhNDQtZzJHcjhfM0FtSncyWFo4a0kxeTBRel96
ZTlpT2NXMlczUkxwWEdnIiwgImdrdnkwRnV2QkJ2ajBoczJaTnd4Y3FPbGY4
bXUyLWtDRTctTmIyUXh1QlUiLCAiaHJZNEhubUY1YjVKd0M5ZVR6YUZDVWNl
SVFBYUlkaHJxVVhRTkNXYmZaSSIsICJ5NlNGclZGUnlxNTBJYlJKdmlUWnFx
alFXejB0TGl1Q21NZU8wS3FhekdJIl19XQ
* Contents: ["eK5o5pHfgupPpltj1qhAJw", "age_equal_or_over", {"_sd":
["1tEiyzPRYOKsf7SsYGMgPZKsOT1lQZRxHXA0r5_Bwkk",
"CVKnly5P90yJs3EwtxQiOtUczaXCYNA4IczRaohrMDg",
"a44-g2Gr8_3AmJw2XZ8kI1y0Qz_ze9iOcW2W3RLpXGg",
"gkvy0FuvBBvj0hs2ZNwxcqOlf8mu2-kCE7-Nb2QxuBU",
"hrY4HnmF5b5JwC9eTzaFCUceIQAaIdhrqUXQNCWbfZI",
"y6SFrVFRyq50IbRJviTZqqjQWz0tLiuCmMeO0KqazGI"]}]
*Claim age_in_years*:
* SHA-256 Hash: LoMGrhlDm_bUWUX1gdhRxTsy4d4zywGzlSVocRSY01M
* Disclosure:
WyJqN0FEZGIwVVZiMExpMGNpUGNQMGV3IiwgImFnZV9pbl95ZWFycyIsIDQ3
XQ
* Contents: ["j7ADdb0UVb0Li0ciPcP0ew", "age_in_years", 47]
*Claim age_birth_year*:
* SHA-256 Hash: rVj3RLs7K8zdNy7zXz1Cr39Y6rog8ulNozk4F7NCuC0
* Disclosure:
WyJXcHhKckZ1WDh1U2kycDRodDA5anZ3IiwgImFnZV9iaXJ0aF95ZWFyIiwg
MTk3OF0
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* Contents: ["WpxJrFuX8uSi2p4ht09jvw", "age_birth_year", 1978]
*Claim portrait*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 9nEwUrdeZ6kcRbEj52QH3nOR-oie0_p9tMNIAEuFvMU
* Disclosure: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* Contents: ["atSmFACYMbJVKD05o3JgtQ", "portrait", "data:image/
png;base6
4,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAACQAAAAWAQMAAACSfKx9AAAAAXNSR0IB2c
ksfwAAAARnQU1BAACxjwv8YQUAAAAgY0hSTQAAeiYAAICEAAD6AAAAgOgAAH
UwAADqYAAAOpgAABdwnLpRPAAAAAZQTFRFAAAA////pdmf3QAAAFFJREFUCN
dNylENgDAQA9ASBJyEWcDBLE0CTpDCpCDhPvexrBwlC/y8NG3RMunw9Ai5p6
/pr/ZzlcAi4WiRN1nlXAesOgheBTSO8JDnND6Z3W+d90fCnTjjKQAAAABJRU
5ErkJggg=="]
*Claim issuance_date*:
* SHA-256 Hash: ezCAmaTwI2nPj_1IiB3KZfiEORLeRwhZsMMDMZIJ8kA
* Disclosure:
WyI0S3lSMzJvSVp0LXprV3ZGcWJVTEtnIiwgImlzc3VhbmNlX2RhdGUiLCAi
MjAyNC0wMS0xNSJd
* Contents: ["4KyR32oIZt-zkWvFqbULKg", "issuance_date",
"2024-01-15"]
*Claim expiry_date*:
* SHA-256 Hash: Y0H-E3hzKEUnAyri_x9tT9k-j4i65ao9hkeEHNexosI
* Disclosure:
WyJjaEJDc3loeWgtSjg2SS1hd1FEaUNRIiwgImV4cGlyeV9kYXRlIiwgIjIw
MzQtMDEtMTUiXQ
* Contents: ["chBCsyhyh-J86I-awQDiCQ", "expiry_date", "2034-01-15"]
*Claim issuing_authority*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 6BzMBk7FGivogbldO75f3NLwjFliCqb7nn1GhgCokrQ
* Disclosure:
WyJmbE5QMW5jTXo5TGctYzlxTUl6XzlnIiwgImlzc3VpbmdfYXV0aG9yaXR5
IiwgIktpbmdkb20gb2YgXHUwMGM2bmRnYXJkLCBNaW5pc3RyeSBvZiBJbnRl
cmlvciJd
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* Contents: ["flNP1ncMz9Lg-c9qMIz_9g", "issuing_authority", "Kingdom
of
\u00c6ndgard, Ministry of Interior"]
*Claim issuing_country*:
* SHA-256 Hash: UgUjq5whzQewO59fVNj0f0mqyV8YPXU54sp4kLecwQk
* Disclosure:
WyJvdm9WMXJraF9BTm04NjFxVUFBMkF3IiwgImlzc3VpbmdfY291bnRyeSIs
ICJcdTAwYzZHIl0
* Contents: ["ovoV1rkh_ANm861qUAA2Aw", "issuing_country", "\u00c6G"]
Figure 26 shows a presentation of the SD-JWT with a Key Binding JWT
that discloses only nationality and the fact that the person is over
18 years old:
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eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjJyMDA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.0bJ9ZMO36qi-SuLQaZZSGJMyA9yO5Z2s
V_lxJyspURbkfmC4P9SlmNizVHyifDPtF9TgfJjKMmvOxMsKSLAdJA~WyJlSzVvNXBIZ
md1cFBwbHRqMXFoQUp3IiwgImFnZV9lcXVhbF9vcl9vdmVyIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIjF0R
Wl5elBSWU9Lc2Y3U3NZR01nUFpLc09UMWxRWlJ4SFhBMHI1X0J3a2siLCAiQ1ZLbmx5N
VA5MHlKczNFd3R4UWlPdFVjemFYQ1lOQTRJY3pSYW9ock1EZyIsICJhNDQtZzJHcjhfM
0FtSncyWFo4a0kxeTBRel96ZTlpT2NXMlczUkxwWEdnIiwgImdrdnkwRnV2QkJ2ajBoc
zJaTnd4Y3FPbGY4bXUyLWtDRTctTmIyUXh1QlUiLCAiaHJZNEhubUY1YjVKd0M5ZVR6Y
UZDVWNlSVFBYUlkaHJxVVhRTkNXYmZaSSIsICJ5NlNGclZGUnlxNTBJYlJKdmlUWnFxa
lFXejB0TGl1Q21NZU8wS3FhekdJIl19XQ~WyJPQktsVFZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFpBIi
wgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaX
RpZXMiLCBbIlx1MDBjNm5kZ2FyZCJdXQ~eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImt
iK2p3dCJ9.eyJub25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL2V4YW
1wbGUuY29tL3ZlcmlmaWVyIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3ODgyMDk5NzgsICJzZF9oYXNoIjogIm
h6UjdZM3RuLUZhYVFhZFQ4OXNDOEpQb2JIb21Zc3JHQUFLMzFvQTV3a2sifQ.yIzSC2i
P2SONasao38xTQ8oR8_RyiF99bwhj4IUdvXR2krhTN838g3xcSxc9JFH365a2WC6S1nd
iua2cD7wCWQ
Figure 26: Presented SD-JWT+KB
Figure 27 is the payload of a corresponding Key Binding JWT:
{
"nonce": "1234567890",
"aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
"iat": 1788209978,
"sd_hash": "hzR7Y3tn-FaaQadT89sC8JPobHomYsrGAAK31oA5wkk"
}
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Figure 27: Key Binding JWT Payload
After validation, the Verifier will have the processed SD-JWT payload
in Figure 28 available for further handling:
{
"iss": "https://pid-issuer.aendgard.example",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "urn:example:eudi:pid:aendgard:1",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
},
"age_equal_or_over": {
"18": true
},
"nationalities": [
"Ændgard"
]
}
Figure 28: Processed SD-JWT Payload
A.2. Example Type Metadata
The following example for Type Metadata assumes an SD-JWT VC payload
structured as follows in Figure 29:
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{
"vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42",
"vct#integrity":
"sha256-vJKakJAQkDYkIhGrT1M3nxRuSj9udH0l1PXB06QHto8=",
"name": "Zaphod Beeblebrox",
"address": {
"street_address": "42 Galaxy Way",
"city": "Betelgeuse City",
"postal_code": "12345",
"country": "Betelgeuse"
},
"degrees": [
{
"field_of_study": "Intergalactic Politics",
"date_awarded": "2020-05-15"
},
{
"field_of_study": "Space Navigation",
"date_awarded": "2018-06-20"
},
{
"field_of_study": "Quantum Mechanics",
"date_awarded": "2016-07-25"
}
]
}
Figure 29: SD-JWT VC Payload
The Type Metadata for this SD-JWT VC could be defined as follows in
Figure 30:
{
"vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential/v42",
"name": "Betelgeuse Education Credential - First Version",
"description":
"This is our first version of the education credential. Don't panic.",
"extends":
"https://galaxy.example.com/galactic-education-credential/v2",
"extends#integrity":
"sha256-ilOUJsTultOwLfz7QUcFALaRa3BP/jelX1ds04kB9yU=",
"display": [
{
"locale": "en-US",
"name": "Betelgeuse Education Credential",
"description":
"Education credential for all carbon-based life forms on Betelgeuse.",
"rendering": {
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"simple": {
"logo": {
"uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/education-logo.png",
"uri#integrity":
"sha256-LmXfh+9cLlJNXN+TsMk+PmKjZ5t0WRL5ca/xGgX3c1U=",
"alt_text": "Betelgeuse Ministry of Education logo"
},
"background_image": {
"uri":
"https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/cred-background.png",
"uri#integrity":
"sha256-5sBT7mMLylHLWrrS/qQ8aHpRAxoraWVmWX6eUVMlrrA="
},
"background_color": "#12107c",
"text_color": "#FFFFFF"
},
"svg_templates": [
{
"uri":
"https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/credential-english.svg",
"uri#integrity":
"sha256-I4JcBGO7UfrkOBrsV7ytNJAfGuKLQh+e+Z31mc7iAb4=",
"properties": {
"orientation": "landscape",
"color_scheme": "light",
"contrast": "high"
}
}
]
}
},
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"name": "Betelgeuse-Bildungsnachweis",
"description":
"Ldungsnachweis für kohlenstoffbasierten Lebensformen auf Betelgeuse.",
"rendering": {
"simple": {
"logo": {
"uri":
"https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/education-logo-de.png",
"uri#integrity":
"sha256-LmXfh+9cLlJNXN+TsMk+PmKjZ5t0WRL5ca/xGgX3c1U=",
"alt_text": "Logo des Betelgeusischen Bildungsministeriums"
},
"background_image": {
"uri":
"https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/cred-background-de.png",
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"uri#integrity":
"sha256-9cLlJNXN+TsMk+PmKjZ5t0WRL5ca/xGgX3c1ULmXfh="
},
"background_color": "#12107c",
"text_color": "#FFFFFF"
},
"svg_templates": [
{
"uri":
"https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/credential-german.svg",
"uri#integrity":
"sha256-I4JcBGO7UfrkOBrsV7ytNJAfGuKLQh+e+Z31mc7iAb4=",
"properties": {
"orientation": "landscape",
"color_scheme": "light",
"contrast": "high"
}
}
]
}
}
],
"claims": [
{
"path": ["name"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"label": "Vor- und Nachname",
"description": "Der Name des/der Studierenden"
},
{
"locale": "en-US",
"label": "Name",
"description": "The name of the student"
}
],
"sd": "always",
"mandatory": true
},
{
"path": ["address"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"label": "Adresse",
"description": "Adresse zum Zeitpunkt des Abschlusses"
},
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{
"locale": "en-US",
"label": "Address",
"description": "Address at the time of graduation"
}
],
"sd": "always"
},
{
"path": ["address", "street_address"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"label": "Straße"
},
{
"locale": "en-US",
"label": "Street Address"
}
],
"sd": "always",
"svg_id": "address_street_address"
},
{
"path": ["degrees"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"label": "Abschlüsse",
"description": "Abschlüsse des/der Studierenden"
},
{
"locale": "en-US",
"label": "Degrees",
"description": "Degrees earned by the student"
}
],
"sd": "never"
},
{
"path": ["degrees", null],
"sd": "always"
},
{
"path": ["degrees", null, "field_of_study"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
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"label": "Studienfach"
},
{
"locale": "en-US",
"label": "Field of Study"
}
],
"sd": "never"
},
{
"path": ["degrees", null, "date_awarded"],
"display": [
{
"locale": "de-DE",
"label": "Verleihungsdatum"
},
{
"locale": "en-US",
"label": "Date Awarded"
}
],
"sd": "always"
}
]
}
Figure 30: Example Type Metadata Document
Note that in this example, there are four definitions affecting the
degrees claim:
1. The degrees array itself is marked as sd: never, meaning the
element degrees cannot be selectively disclosed and will always
exist in the disclosed SD-JWT. Changing this to sd: always would
mean that the degrees array itself is selectively disclosable.
2. Each item in the degrees array (denoted by null in the path) is
marked as sd: always, meaning each degree object will be
selectively disclosed as a whole.
3. The field_of_study property of each degree object is marked as
sd: never, meaning that if the respective degree object is
disclosed, the field_of_study property will always be included
and cannot be hidden.
4. The date_awarded property of each degree object is marked as sd:
always, meaning it can be selectively disclosed.
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Appendix B. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Aaron Parecki, Alen Horvat, Andres Uribe,
Andrii Deinega, Annabelle Kennedy, Babis Routis, Christian Bormann,
Dan Moore, Deb Cooley, Denis Pinkas, George J Padayatti, Giuseppe De
Marco, Hannes Tschofenig, Lukas J Han, Lukasz Jaromin, Leif
Johansson, Mark Nottingham, Michael B. Jones, Mike Prorock, Mirko
Mollik, Nat Sakimura, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pavel Zarecky,
Stefan Charsley, Tim Cappalli, Timo Glastra, Torsten Lodderstedt,
Tobias Looker, and Kristina Yasuda for their contributions (some of
which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of
implementations.
Appendix C. Document History
-19
* Address HTTP Directorate review:
- Added a general section on retrieving documents and resources
via HTTP, covering HTTP/caching semantics (RFC 9110, RFC 9111),
redirect handling, scheme requirements, and time-bound/size-
bound retrieval for all URLs dereferenced per this
specification
- Describe successful metadata responses in terms of their
content and media type instead of pinning the HTTP 200 status
code
- Base the caching rules on the HTTP caching model of RFC 9111,
recommend explicit freshness lifetimes, and clarify that
integrity-keyed indefinite caching is independent of response
caching directives
- Define the integrity verification procedure directly in this
specification, using W3C SRI only for the syntax of the
integrity metadata string and hash algorithm identification,
and clarify that CORS is not required
- Constrain rendering resource URIs to HTTPS URLs or data: URIs
and apply the general retrieval and SSRF requirements to them
and to the JWK Set referenced by jwks_uri
- Generalize the SSRF considerations to all dereferenced URLs,
including redirect targets, and define internal resources with
reference to RFC 6890
- Recommend nosniff and Content-Security-Policy response header
fields when serving documents and rendering resources
- Added a complete HTTP response example for JWT VC Issuer
Metadata
- Use the BCP 14 (RFC 8174) boilerplate and add a reference to
RFC 3986 for URL components
- Note privacy implications of retrieving rendering resources
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* Be more explicit about JWS JSON serialization being not explicitly
defined for SD-JWT VCs
* Address AD review:
- Clarify that claims that must not be selectively disclosed
includes their sub-claims not being selectively disclosable
- Remove: "Note that this draft used vc+sd-jwt as the value of
the typ header from its inception in July 2023 until November
2024 when it was changed to dc+sd-jwt to avoid conflict with
the vc media type name registered by the W3C's Verifiable
Credentials Data Model draft. In order to facilitate a
minimally disruptive transition, both vc+sd-jwt and dc+sd-jwt
should be accepted as the value of the typ header for a
reasonable transitional period."
- Not use big 2119 language in the first paragraph of the Display
Metadata section
- Add a bit more explanation about aka_vcts
- Add refs with URLs for the IANA registries for media types and
JWT claims
- Move SVG template rendering security stuff into a new security
considerations subsection
-18
* Added the optional aka_vcts claim, conveying additional types of
the credential.
* Update obsoleted reference, move IANA Considerations, fix long
lines, other nits
-17
* Clarified when optional Type Metadata processing occurs and how
ecosystem rules can require it, in a new Processing Type Metadata
section.
* Require rejection when processed claim metadata is malformed or
when mandatory or sd claim metadata does not match the credential.
* Clarified claim metadata validation for presentations: a Verifier
must not treat absence of a selectively disclosable claim as a
missing mandatory claim, and array positions in path account for
array elements that are not disclosed.
* Moved the vct#integrity requirement to the general Type Metadata
retrieval section.
* path processing yields an empty set instead of an error when no
claims are selected.
* Updated the referenced document integrity wording.
* Editorial fixes.
-16
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* shepherd review and resulting changes
* use key discovery and validation mechanism instead of Issuer
Signature Mechanism
* moved Display Metadata and Claim Metadata to be subsections of SD-
JWT VC Type Metadata
-15
* remove unnecessary Relationships to Other Documents section
-14
* State more explicitly that additional Issuer Signature Mechanisms
can complement or override the defined mechanisms
* Add example of a vct value that is versioned (in the text)
* Use the three-word term Verifiable Digital Credential as
consistently as possible throughout the document
* Update draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt references to
point to RFC 9901
* More consistent use of application/json content type and 200
status code when retrieving metadata
* Editorial improvements based on review feedback of -13
* Expand the example showing the vct claim
* Number and label the examples/figures
* Fix reference to Subresource Integrity document to point to W3C
Recommendation version
* Move Privacy-Preserving Retrieval of Type Metadata section to
Privacy Considerations where it belongs
* Move RFC 2397 to informative (only mentioned once and behind a
SHOULD)
* Add line break between the two things in the JSON Web Token Claims
Registration section
* Error responses both for JWT VC Issuer Metadata and Type Metadata
retrieval now MUST use appropriate HTTP status codes
* Clarified that if an integrity property is present for a
particular claim/property, the Consumer MUST verify the integrity
of the retrieved document.
* Fixed the description of the claim metadata extension rules to
correctly reflect the intended behavior.
* Added a note explaining the difference in overriding rules between
claim metadata and display metadata when extending types.
* Merged section section 4 into section 3
* Replaced the term wallet with holder for consistency reasons
-13
* Updated svg_template to match pluralised appendix example
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-12
* Change lang to locale. While lang is more accurate, locale is
what has traditionally been used in OpenID Connect and later
related specs.
* Remove JSON schema from Type Metadata
* Introduce optional mandatory property for claims
* Explicitly mention that Type Metadata can have additional stuff
that has to be ignored if not understood
* Clarify that an SD-JWT VC doesn't contain a KB-JWT but rather
might have an associated one (which makes it a SD-JWT+KB and Brian
is still not sure about the term or these words, but it's where
we've ended up)
* Remove the requirement to ignore unknown claims, as some
applications may not want to follow this rule
* Fix cnf claim and JWK references and move them to normative
* List vct as one of the required values in type metadata and ensure
that the use of the document integrity claims is clear
* Remove discussion of status and Status Provider from the
Introduction
* Add a background_image property to the simple rendering aligned
with the definition in OpenID4VCI
* Recommend to use sd=always or sd=never to avoid ambiguity and
introduce rules for sd and mandatory when extending types
* Provide some guidance on versioning via the vct value
* Add security considerations for trust in type metadata
* Require data URIs for non-JSON types
* Require x5c to be in the protected header
* Clarify presentations of SD-JWT VC do not require KB
* Updated/expanded example for Type Metadata
* Be more consistent with style for lists of claims/parameters/
properties
* Update PID example to make clear that it is not normative
* Clarification on processing of display metadata
-11
* Clarify extend support for claim metadata
* Add privacy concerns regarding the use of x5u parameter in JWKs
and similar remote retrieval mechanisms
* Added a section on Credential Type Extension and Issuer
Authorization.
* Fixed an inconsistency to the description of display attribute of
claim metadata.
* add vct#integrity to the list of claims that cannot be selectively
disclosed
* Drop explicit treatment of the glue type metadata document concept
* Editorial updates and fixes.
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* State that when the status claim is present and using the
status_list mechanism, the associated Status List Token has to be
a JWT.
* vct datatype is now just a string
-10
* Rename 'Issuer-signed JWT Verification Key Validation' to 'Issuer
Signature Mechanisms' and rework some text accordingly. Provide a
web-based metadata resolution mechanism and an inline x509
mechanism. A DID-based mechanism is not explicitly provided
herein but still possible via profile/extension. Be explicit that
the employed Issuer Signature Mechanism has to be one that is
permitted for the Issuer according to policy. Be more clear that
one permitted Issuer Signature Mechanism is sufficient.
* Fix "[...]#integrity" claim values in examples (Subresource
Integrity uses regular base64 encoding and some were wrong length)
-09
* Use SD-JWT KB in place of SD-JWT with Key Binding JWT
* Editorial changes
* Document reasons for not using JSON Pointer or JSON Path (Issue
267)
* Clarify that private claim names MAY be used
* Update PID Example
* Fix section numbering in a few SD-JWT references
-08
* Fix formatting issue introduced by the reintroduction of the DID
paragraph in -07
-07
* Revert change from previous release that removed explicit mention
of DIDs in the Issuer-signed JWT Verification Key Validation
section
* Remove the requirement to insert a .well-known part for vct URLs
* fix section numbering in SD-JWT references to align with the
latest -14 version
-06
* Update the anticipated media type registration request from
application/vc+sd-jwt to application/dc+sd-jwt
* Tightened the exposition of the Issuer-signed JWT Verification Key
Validation section
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* Add the “Status” field for the well-known URI registration per
IANA early review
-05
* Include display and claim type metadata
* Added example for type metadata
* Clarify, add context, or otherwise improved the examples
-04
* update reference to IETF Status List
* Include Type Metadata
* Include schema Type Metadata
* Editorial changes
* Updated terminology to clarify digital signatures are one way to
secure VCs and presentations
* Rework key resolution/validation for x5c
-03
* Include disclosure of age_equal_or_over/18 in the PID example
-02
* Made specific rules for public verification key validation
conditional
* Finetuned rules for obtaining public verification key
* Editorial changes
* added Brian Campbell as co-author
* Renamed JWT Issuer Metadata to JWT VC Issuer Metadata
* 'iat' is now optional and allowed to be selectively disclosable
* Fix inconstancy in the .well-known path construction
* Added registration request to IANA for the well-known URI
* Fix some formatting and text in the media type and JWT claim
registration requests
* Clarify the optionality of the cnf claim
* Added relationships to other documents
* Added PID example
-01
* Introduce rules for type identifiers (Collision-Resistant Name)
* Rename type to vct
* Removed duplicated and inconsistent requirements on KB-JWT
* Editorial changes
* Added issuer public verification key discovery section.
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-00
* Upload as draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-00
* Aligned terminology and descriptions with latest version of SD-JWT
[[ pre Working Group Adoption: ]]
-00
* Initial Version
* Removed W3C VCDM transformation algorithm
* Various editorial changes based on feedback
* Adjusted terminology based on feedback
* Added non-selectively disclosable JWT VC
* Added a note that this is not W3C VCDM
Authors' Addresses
Oliver Terbu
MATTR
Email: oliver.terbu@mattr.global
Daniel Fett
Authlete Inc.
Email: mail@danielfett.de
Brian Campbell
Ping Identity
Email: bcampbell@pingidentity.com
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